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Abstract
Th e article aims to advance our understanding of what the early Heidegger had in mind when 
he spoke about technics. Taking GA 18, Grundbegriﬀ e der aristotelischen Philosophie, as a guiding 
text, Heidegger’s “destructive” reading of the two notions most directly associated with Aristotle’s 
presentation of technics—τέχνη and ἕξις—will be examined, especially with reference to the 
portrayal of technics in the Nicomachean Ethics. It will be argued that Aristotle already exagger-
ated the distinction between virtue and skill and that, instead of insisting on their similarities (as 
will be argued to be desirable), Heidegger drove the two notions even further apart. Th is enabled 
him to form a warped picture of technical life, which he exploited as a counter image to develop 
an unrealistically non-technical notion of πρᾶξις, which Heidegger implicitly advocates.
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It has been recognized for some time now that the early Heidegger’s work was 
led by a threefold formal structure: a reduction or return to the primal phe-
nomena, by means of a “destructive” reading of texts of the philosophical 
tradition, thereby disobstructing and facilitating our access to the primal phe-
nomena, and a construction of an appropriate articulation of these phenom-
ena. In this study I shall retrace one of these ways of “Rückgang zum Boden,” 
and this with an agenda set not by Heidegger but by myself, thereby taking 
seriously the suggestion (or challenge?) of Heidegger that “perhaps it is not 
possible, for someone that has learned to understand an author, to take what 
the latter indicates as the most important as basis for the interpretation” (GA 
19: 46)1 My aim, however, is less ambitious than ﬁ nding a basis for interpreting 
1) “Vielleicht ist es für den, der gelernt hat, einen Autor zu verstehen, nicht möglich, das, was 
dieser selbst als das Wichtigste bezeignet, zur Grundlage der Interpretation zu nehmen.” (Unless 
318 E. Wolﬀ  / Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008) 317–357
Heidegger. What will be at stake in this study is the articulation or interpreta-
tion of a particular phenomenon and not, in the ﬁ rst place, the ontological 
implications thereof. Th e theme of my questioning concerns the perspective 
developed by Heidegger in the early 1920s on human technicity.
In what follows I shall attempt to walk the way of reduction with Heidegger 
to the phenomenon of technicity in order to explore what contribution he 
makes to an understanding thereof. Earlier studies of technics in Heidegger’s 
philosophy (up to the early 1980s) were obliged to put the emphasis on the 
work after the Kehre2 or to be restricted to Sein und Zeit,3 since the researchers 
had limited access to Heidegger’s lectures published in the Gesamtausgabe. 
When these became available they were exploited (since the late 1980s) by 
authors of the like of Volpi, Taminiaux, Bernasconi, and others, who where 
especially interested in the ontological reworking of Aristotelian notions, of 
which ποίησις and πρᾶξις took center stage.4 Th e question of technics comes 
under discussion in these studies within the framework presented for it by 
Heidegger: that of the Destruktion of the metaphysics of presence. Th e publi-
cation of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe is now so advanced that the texts 
otherwise stated, all translations from German and Greek are my own; text abbreviations are 
appended.) 
2) Cf. for example John Loscerbo, Being and Technology. A Study in the Philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger. Phaenomenologica 82 (Th e Hague: Martinus Nijhoﬀ , 1981) and Günther Seubold, 
Heideggers Analyse der neuzeitlichen Technik (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1986).
3) Cf., for example, Hubert Dreyfus, “De la techné à la technique: le statut ambigue de 
l’ustensilité dans L’être et le temps,” in Martin Heidegger, ed. Michel Haar  (Paris: l’Herne, 1983), 
283–303.
4) Franco Volpi has done a lot to make the ﬁ ndings of his Heidegger e Aristotele (Padua: Daphne, 
1984) available for non-Italian readers in further studies, see “Dasein comme praxis: L’assimilation 
et la radicalisation heideggeriene de la philosophie pratique d’Aristote,” in F. Volpi et al., 
Heidegger et l’idée de la phenomenology. Phaenomenologica 108 (Dortrecht: 1988), 1–42, and 
“Der Bezug zu Platon und Aristoteles in Heideggers Fundamentalverständnis der Technik,” in 
Kunst und Technik. Gedächtnisschrift zum 100. Geburtstag von Martin Heidegger, ed. W. Biemel 
and F. W. von Hermann (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1989), 67–91.
 For Jacques Taminiaux, see “Poiesis et Praxis dans l’articulation de l’ontologie fondamentale,” 
in F. Volpi et al., Heidegger et l’idée de la phenomenology,  107–26; “Heidegger et les Grecs à 
l’époque de l’ontologie fondamentale,” Etudes phénoménologiques 1 (1985): 95–112.
 For Robert Bernasconi, see “Th e Fate of the Distinction between Praxis and Poesis,” Heidegger 
Studies 2 (1986): 111–39 and “Heidegger’s Destruction of Phronesis,” Southern Journal of Phi-
losophy 28, Supplement (1989): 127–48.
 In all three of these cases I have selected only what seems to me most useful for the current 
purposes from a much more abundant literature.
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available for studying technicity in the early Heidegger have become too volu-
minous to allow for an exhaustive discussion and analysis, in the scope of an 
article in any case. For the purposes of the current essay, the question will be 
thematically limited to repeating Heidegger’s reading of (aspects of ) two of 
Aristotle’s notions, τέχνη and ἕξις, even though by doing so, the very notion 
of repetition (Wiederholung) will be critically examined. At the same time the 
most suitable text for this purpose seems to be the fairly recently published GA 
18 (lectures of the Marburg summer semester of 1924).  
GA 18 bears the title Grundbegriﬀ e der Aristotelischen Philosophie, but one 
notices very quickly—as Gadamer testiﬁ ed of his experience as his student5—
that one is not always sure of whose voice one is hearing, Heidegger’s or Aris-
totle’s. But what is decisive is that at crucial instances this volume could just as 
well have carried the title Grundbegriﬀ e der Heideggerschen Philosophie. In set-
ting out to explore the idea of technicity that Heidegger develops in reading 
Aristotle, I shall present elements of Aristotle’s idea of τέχνη and ἕξις (without 
any claim to exhaustivity), ﬁ rst to declare my own reading thereof and thus to 
put my cards on the table for the reader to see, but then, by indicating Hei-
degger’s divergence from it, to show what Heidegger was working on and, 
more importantly, what other interpretational possibilities there were available 
to him. Nowhere shall I use Aristotle to “correct” Heidegger; Aristotle plays a 
heuristic role in my essay (of course without being unconscious of the other 
inﬂ uences on Heidegger).
In turning back with Heidegger to Aristotle, I shall not be concerned with 
the ontological project of these lectures but will ask: In this deconstructive 
reading of the tradition of Western philosophy, what happens to the phenom-
enon of human technicity? What perspective is presented on technicity? Two 
of the Aristotelian Grundbegriﬀ e will pave the way to my answerring this ques-
tion: τέχνη and ἕξις. GA 18 is exceptional, compared to the other lecture 
courses, in that there is a reading by Heidegger of both of these notions. Fur-
thermore, the analyses of τέχνη and ἕξις are embedded in the same chapter 
of this lecture series,6 and that is structured by Heidegger’s reappropriation 
of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. It will become clear that this setting has important 
5) Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophische Lehrjahre (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1977), 
216.
6) Namely, “Die Auslegung des Daseins des Menschen hinsichtlich der Grundmöglichkeit des 
Miteinandersprechens am Leitfaden der Rhetorik,” which is chapter three of part one: “Vorver-
ständigung über die Bodenständigkeit der Begriﬄ  ichkeit auf dem Wege einer Explikation des 
Daseins als In-der-Welt-sein in der Orientierung an aristotelischen Grundbegriﬀ en.”
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consequences for Heidegger’s articulation of the relation between technicity 
and sociality. While close-reading Heidegger and his Aristotelian backdrop, I 
shall develop a criticism by means of which I would suggest to improve the 
notion of technicity present in these lectures.
1. Setting the Stage for Technicity: Being-in-the-World, Care and 
Understanding
According to Heidegger’s ontologizing reappropriation of Aristotle’s doctrine 
of the soul (ψυχή), human existence consists of characterizing life as being-in-
the-world; as such it cares for its own being (cf. GA 18: 44).7 A ﬁ rst sketch of 
what this means is given in §9, entitled “Human existence as ψυχή” (Das Da-
sein des Menschen als ψυχή). Th is existence as ψυχή has the fundamental possi-
bility (Grundmöglichkeit) of being-in-the-polis, of Miteinandersein, of κοινωνία 
(GA 18: 46). Th is fact is brought to the fore by Aristotle by indicating that the 
human being is λόγον ἔχειν (GA 18: 46).8 Th e human being is in the world in 
such a way that this being-in concerns him/her (GA 18: 51), and in this con-
cern the world is opened (erschlossen) to the human being (GA 18: 52).9 By 
concernfully being-in-the-world and engaging with (umgehen mit) things, these 
are interpreted as being such or such. Th e explicit articulation of this interpre-
tation is the λόγος τι κατά τινος: “in the speaking about something, I presentify 
it, I bring it to the there, it as this and that, in the character of as [Im Sprechen 
über etwas vergegenwärtige ich es, bringe ich es ins Da, es als das und das, im Cha-
rakter des Als]” (GA 18: 60). But saying to oneself that something is a this or a 
that could be done only since there is a more original expression of things, 
namely, the expression of their being such or such in discussion with others; 
“speaking is showing or pointing out self-expressing to . . .” (Sprechen ist aufzei-
7) According to “Ontologie des Lebens und des Daseins” in GA 22, §§65–66, Aristotle aimed at 
developing an ontology of life with his doctrine of the soul. Th e latter is deﬁ ned, following De 
anima 402a6f: [Ψυχή] ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχή τῶν ζῷων, “sie ist so etwas wie der Seinsgrund des 
Seienden, das lebt” (GA 22: 184). 
8) Cf. GA 18: 50: “Sprechen ist nicht primär und zunächst ein Vorgang, zu dem nachher andere 
Menschen dazukommen, so daß es dann erst ein Sprechen mit anderen würde, sondern das 
Sprechen ist in ihm selbst als solches Sichaussprechen, Miteinandersprechen mit anderen 
Sprechenden und deshalb das seinsmäßige Fundament der κοινωνία.”
9) GA 18: 52: “Die Erschlossenheit des Seins der Welt hat bei Aristoteles ihre eigentliche Grund-
möglichkeit im λόγος, in dem Sinn, daß im λόγος das Lebende-in-einer-Welt die Welt sich 
zueignet, da hat und in diesem Dahaben eigentlich ist und sich bewegt.”
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gendes sichaussprechen zu . . .) (GA 18: 61). Th e care (πρᾶξις)10 that has to engage 
in resolution or choice (προαίρεσις) in the moment or concrete situation 
(καιρός) (cf. GA 18: 58, 59 & 60) as it goes about in the world (the Sichumtun 
in der Welt [GA 18: 62]) is determined by the λόγος, such that care is right in 
the middle (mittendrin) of the λόγος in the κοινωνία.11 Th e ζῷον πολιτικόν, 
who is the ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, exists ordinarily not in a way as to be in a position 
to say “I am,” but rather in a way as to say “I am one” (ich bin man), I am as 
‘one’ is or as ‘they’ are; “this one is the actual ‘who’ of everydayness, of the average 
concrete being-with-one-another. One develops from such average everydayness 
the way and manner in which the human being sees the world at ﬁ rst and for 
the most part, how the world concerns a human being, how the human being 
addresses the world. ‘One’ is the actual ‘how’ of the being of the human being 
in the everydayness and the actual bearer of this ‘one’ is language”(GA 18: 64).12 
Th is is true also when the human being in question is practicing the θεωρεῖν 
(Hinsehen, inspection), in which the generality and universal validity of the 
εἶδος (Aussehen, appearance) is prevalent.13
One recognizes in these phrases the outline of some of the most salient ele-
ments of the later Daseinsanalyse in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger is well along in his 
project of reconducting intentionality to the broader ontological phenomenon 
of care (as for instance in GA 20, §31). At the same time his reworking of the 
Husserlian intuition to understanding has clearly taken a Heideggerian shape.14 
10) For a usefull overview of Heidegger’s ontologizing reappropriation of Aristotle’s πρᾶξις, see 
Roberto Rubio “La relevance de la praxis en la ontologia del Dasein,” Areté 15, no. 2 (2003): 
303–23 (especially the summary p. 312) and Volpi, “Dasein comme praxis: L’assimilation et la 
radicalization heideggeriene de la philosophie pratique d’Aristote.”
11) GA 18: 61: “Das Besorgen ist μετὰ λόγου. Μετα besagt hier “mittendrin”: Der λόγος 
gehört zum Besorgen, das Besorgen ist an sich selbst ein Sprechen, ein Besprechen.”
12) “Dieses Man ist das eigentliche Wie der Alltäglichkeit, des durchschnittlichen konkreten Mitein-
anderseins. Aus diesem Man heraus erwächst die Art und Weise, wie der Mensch die Welt 
zunächst und zumeist sieht, wie die Welt den Menschen angeht, wie er die Welt ansprecht. Das 
Man ist das eigentliche Wie des Seins des Menschen in der Alltäglichkeit und der eigentlicher 
Träger dieses Man ist die Sprache.”
13) GA 18: 64: “Die Grundbestimmung des Seins des Menschen als ζῷον πολιτικόν ist festzu-
halten, auch bei der späteren Explikation, wie es sich um das ‘Hinsehen’, θεωρεῖν, auf die Welt 
handelt, um das, was in diesem Hinsehen das ist, das εἶδος, das ‘Aussehen’ der Welt, wie man 
sie gewöhnlich sieht.”
14) Cf. the studies of Jean Greisch , Ontologie et temporalité. Esquisse d’une interprétation intégrale 
de Sein und Zeit. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994): especially 23–30, and Th eodore 
Kisiel, “From Intuition to Understanding: On Heidegger’s Transpositions of Husserl’s Phenom-
enology,” in Heidegger’s Way of Th ought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts (London: Contin-
uum, 2002), 174–86.
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Th e going about in the world as whole of references, of meanings, that will be 
much more developed (for instance in GA 20, §23) and the exploration of the 
hermeneutics that Dasein itself is in having-to-do with things and which will 
be the condition for the expression of understanding (as worked out in GA 21, 
§12) are presented in a nutshell.
Two elements of this analysis should be highlighted in order to set the stage 
for the ensuing discussion.
1.  Heidegger’s leading intentionality back to care or the enlargement of inten-
tionality to care made it possible to enlarge Husserl’s intuition to under-
standing. Th is shift brings with it a change in the perspective on the human 
being needed for this project: understanding means ﬁ rst of all a possibility, 
rather than a cognitive activity. Heidegger explains that care is character-
ized as understanding uncovery (Entdecktheit) in every possibility to act; 
saying that I am, means, I can;15 in fact, in a language perhaps more easily 
associated with Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger says: “in every [act of ] care and 
in every being that is taken care of involves a priori the mode of being of ‘I 
can’, and to be precise it is this ‘I can’ as the condition of being of human 
existence always as understanding ‘I can’ (GA 20: 412).16 Hence the impor-
tance of exploring the everyday engagement with the things in the world: 
it is only through this concernful interaction with the things of the world 
that the world as whole of signiﬁ cances arises, which in turn makes all 
understanding and interpretation possible.17 
2.  Since Heidegger is concerned about highlighting this pre-character (Char-
akter des Vor, as for instance in Vorhabe and Vertrautheit in GA 63, §§18–20 
& 24) of our engagement with the world, since this engagement is always 
already an understanding and not a synthesis of sense data, the Sitz-im-
Leben from where he explores the engagement is the life of the person who 
is already technically dexterous, who has already learned how and for what 
to use tools, who is already in interaction with other people, which makes 
15) Cf. GA 20: 412: “Verstehen besagt hier soviel wie ‘können’ und ‘können’ bedeutet: bei sich 
selbst die Möglichkeit haben zu etwas.”
16) “In jedem Besorgen und in jedem Seienden, das durch die Sorge bestimmt ist, liegt a priori 
mit die Seinsart des ‘Ich kann’, und zwar ist es diese ‘Ich kann’ als Seinsverfassung des Daseins 
immer als verstehendes ‘Ich kann’.
17) And hence the possibility for reading Heidegger’s early philosophy as a “pragmatism,” as was 
done for instance by Carl Friedrich Gethmann; see, for example, his “Heideggers Konzeption 
des Handelns in Sein und Zeit,” in Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie, ed. Annemarie Geth-
mann-Siefert and Otto Pöggeler (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 140–76.
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possible that this socially situated artisan could understand the work-world, 
and that understanding and being familiar with (the Vertrautheit) could be, 
for all purposes, synonymous. In other words, the paradigmatic situation 
from which Heidegger constructs his notions of world and understanding 
(and thus the notions of “world” and “understanding” themselves) is only 
possible through 1) exercise and training in the constant, competent prac-
tice of a skill or art, that also generates the capacity for recognition of the 
same and of similar things and situations without which the acquisition of 
such skills is unthinkable; and 2) this is only conceivable in an existence 
with others from whom the artisan learns and with whom he/she interacts. 
Without these two conditions, there is no orginary hermeneutical as. How-
ever, Heidegger does not examine the process by which one is familiarized 
with the work-world, by which one comes to understand.18 Already very 
early on he considers the multiple engagements with what one is occupied 
with as being performed “each time in a certain acquaintance and familiar-
ity.”19 Since he does not pose this question of familiarization, it comes fairly 
easily to him to presuppose a certain character of the technical life, which 
would serve his ontological arguments. A large part of this idea of technical 
life he inherits from Aristotle. 
In this essay I shall not question the elements of the Heideggerian hermeneu-
tics summarized here. What I shall do is interrogate the origin of this herme-
neutics by an exploration of the kind of notion of technicity in τέχνη and ἕξις 
that is presupposed by this hermeneutics.
18) It is true, as Th eodore Kisiel indicates in “From Intuition to Understanding,” that for 
Heidegger “[t]he primary given is the world and not things, the primary presence is meaning and 
not objects” (181) and that being or dwelling in this world of meaning is continuously energized 
by the “habit of our habitat” (182), so that “simply by living, or living thus simply, I acquire 
these peculiar possessions, the habits of my habitat that constitute my most immediate having, 
the having of having-been whose eﬀ ects persist, the present perfect a priori [reference to SZ 
85.—EW] as my prepossession” (182). But of the process of the “acquisition” of “habit,” which 
stands at the center of my concern, Heidegger speaks only obliquely, and it is only as such exam-
ined by Kisiel. 
19) Cf. NB 15 : “Hantieren an, Bereitstellen von, Herstellen von, Sicherstellen durch, in 
Gebrauchnehmen von, Verwenden für, in Besitznehmen von, in Verwahrung halten und in 
Verlust geraten lassen. Das je diesen Weisen entsprechende Womit des verrichtenden Umgangs 
steht dabei jeweils in einer bestimmten Bekanntheit und Vertrautheit.”
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2. Techné (Skill)
I shall attempt to go back to what Heidegger in two “methodological” para-
graphs calls “the ground experience in which I make the character of the theme 
accessible to myself ” (die Grunderfahrung, in der ich mir den Sachcharakter 
zugänglich mache) and that “lies in life’s going about with its world” (liegt im 
Umgang des Lebens mit seiner Welt) (GA 18: 14, see also 270). Th is will be done 
not directly but, as Heidegger does, with Aristotle as guide. Th e two ground 
experiences that will become our theme carry the names of τέχνη and ἕξις 
(and will be explored in the next two sections respectively).
A ﬁ rst general circumscription of τέχνη is given by Heidegger as “the 
knowing-your-way-about something, in a particular manner of concern” (das 
Sichauskennen in etwas, in einer bestimmten Weise des Besorgens) and where 
concern is a being after something (Hinterhersein) (GA 18: 67); since this 
concern is circumspect (umsichtig) (GA 18: 68), τέχνη evidently shows itself 
clearly in what it was after, its τέλος, its good (ἀγαθον). Since this circumscrip-
tion is derived from Aristotle, let us now turn to him ﬁ rst in order to form an 
idea of his notion of τέχνη and to see where it comes from.
2.1 Aristotle: Technai as Opposed to Aretai
Aristotle gives us a useful set of ideas on technical life when he contrasts τέχνη 
and the τεχναί with ἀρεταί (virtues), in order to teach his students about the 
nature of virtues.
According to Aristotle human beings are born with natural dispositions 
(due to their φύσις) but are capable of acquiring additional dispositions 
(ἕξεις) through habituation (ἐθιζειν), i.e. the repeated practice of the appro-
priate action (cf. EN 1103a16–26). In fact, the quality of this disposition 
depends (at least to a large extent) on the quality of habituation to the right 
kind of actions since childhood (cf. EN 1103a14–16 & 1103b21–25). If 
this holds true for moral virtues (ἀρεταί), it certainly also holds true for 
practical skills (τεχναί), two terms that semantically overlap. Th is becomes 
apparent in the discussion of the acquisition of the moral virtues in Book 2 
of the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle argues time and again by using 
technical skill as analogy for virtue. Th erefore, when Aristotle describes in 
his Ethics how the human being works (the human ἔργον) and seeks to 
explain how well-being (εὐδαιμονία) is attained by functioning well (i.e. 
κατ᾽ ἀρετήν), he deemed it necessary to distinguish the two notions, ἀρετή 
and τέχνη.
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In EN 1105a17–b15 Aristotle develops an argument to support his view 
that an action worthy of (ethical) approbation is such not by means of its 
inherent qualities but as a result of the qualities of the agent thereof. In a ﬁ rst 
movement he illustrates what he means by an analogy from the τεχναί, gram-
mar, and music (i.e., from the domain of production, ποίησις). You would not 
call anyone musical for having played a good tune once; you consider the tune 
to be a manifestation of musical talent only if that tune sprang forth from 
musical knowledge. But after having drawn this analogy, Aristotle then takes 
a step back and in a second movement claims that in fact, skills and virtues are 
quite dissimilar (ἔτι οὐδ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν). He 
argues this, by changing his angle of approach from the author of the action 
to the “product” of action. To qualify the products of a skill (τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν 
γινόμενα) as good, one does not need to know anything about their producer, 
since they have in themselves what enables one to qualify them as such (  υ ἔχει 
ἐν αὑτοῖς): when I see a stylish suit in the shop, I buy it if I judge it to be of 
good quality, without bothering to know anything about the kind of person 
that brought this product into existence. Th e converse would be true in the 
domain of πρᾶξις, that is, in the case of what is brought about by virtue (τὰ 
κατὰ τας ἀρετὰς γινόμενα). Th ese are not   υ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς, but could be char-
acterized as of this or that virtue, only if the doer does them from a speciﬁ c 
acquired state (καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πως ἐχων πράττῃ). Th e virtuous action, then, 
bears the three following characteristics: 1) the agent must act with knowledge 
(ἐιδώς) (probably of the kind of action to be accomplished); 2) the agent must 
be exercising a considered choice (προαιρούμενος), and this consideration or 
deliberation should be such that it leads to choosing actions for themselves 
(δι᾽ αὐτα); and 3) the action must proceed from a ﬁ rm and stable disposition 
(ἔχων). Th e ﬁ rst of these is the least important, says Aristotle, but is the only 
characteristic of the agent of virtue shared with the agent of skill, for whom 
knowledge is much more important. Virtue stems only from the repeated 
practice or performance (πολλάκις πράττειν) of virtuous action.
Let us consider this threefold distinction. Aristotle already conceded that 
the ﬁ rst is shared by virtue and skill, although knowledge carries a diﬀ erent 
weight in each. As for the second distinction, it is true that Aristotle uses the 
word προαίρεσις for the kind of choice that has from the outset been stamped 
by its restriction to virtues, and thus to the domain of πρᾶξις—as could be 
seen for instance in the deﬁ nition of moral virtues in EN 1139a22–23: “the 
ethical or character virtue is a disposition for a choice and where choice is a 
deliberative desire” (ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις 
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βουλευτική). But I can see no reason why this term could not just as well 
apply to the τεχναί.20 If one considers the fact that προαίρεσις is deﬁ ned as 
deliberative desire (ὄρεξις βουλευτική) and that βουλευσις—as we shall see 
later on—is deliberation not only about matters of πρᾶξις but also about mat-
ters of ποίησις,21 this suggestion seems to carry some weight. In fact, in order 
to practice a τέχνη well (κατ᾽ ἀρετήν, if I may), it will have to be πολλάκις 
πράττειν (provided that πράττειν is used here in its most general sense of 
“doing something”), since it is only the frequent and continuous exercise of a 
skill that allows for the mastering of it or acquiring mastering as ἕξις that 
would (but does not automatically) allow the craftsman to produce something 
of quality. With this last statement, the third quality of the agent of virtue has 
also been regained for the practitioner in the ﬁ eld of ποίησις. Th e major point 
of distinction between virtue and skill that remains is that virtuous actions are 
chosen for themselves. Th is distinction seems to me to hold, though I would 
maintain that often the virtue is practiced by means of the skill; and some-
times the very practice of a skill might correspond with the practice of a virtue. 
Aristotle seems to hold the same opinion when he aﬃ  rms that ποίησις (pro-
duction) is guided or governed by πρᾶξις (action).22 
In the preceding paragraph, I have argued that the three characteristics of 
the virtuous agent, by which a virtuous action is recognized, apply to a greater 
extent to the skillful agent than Aristotle would allow for. I did so by judging 
the product by looking at its producer, as did Aristotle with the virtues. But he 
20) Michael Pakaluk concludes his discussion of προαίρεσις in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. 
An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129–36, by proposing the following deﬁ ni-
tion: “prohairesis is a rational ability; it operates from an all things considered perspective; it 
varies in eﬀ ectiveness (resolve, strength); and it is essentially practical, in that it is directed at 
actions immediately within my power. It expresses a kind of practical judgment as regards the 
goodness or badness of things, in the very seeking of them” (135). Th is deﬁ nition guides my 
remarks above.
21) For the double use of the word βουλευσις, cf. Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 286.
We shall see later on that Heidegger used the word προαίρεσις for τέχνη in GA 19: 42.
22) Cf. EN 1139a35–b4. I cannot go into the exegetical diﬃ  culties associated with Aristotle’s 
distinction between πρᾶξις and ποίησις. It will however be clear that my perspective on tech-
nicity tends to go in the direction of this passage of Aristotle’s on πρᾶξις as governing ποίησις. 
I share Bernasconi’s reading according to which “the for-the-sake-of, which governs praxis and 
belongs to it, is also the principle of poiesis” and this amounts to “understanding techne as 
piloted by phronesis through the proairesis. Th us phronesis also becomes concerned with techni-
cal issues and with intermediary steps” (“Th e Fate of the Distinction between Praxis and Poesis,” 
137–38).
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also distinguished skill from virtue by stating that the products of skill are   υ 
ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς. Th is might be true, let us say, for a good watch: if it is good, but 
the craftsman was not, it does not disqualify the product from being good 
(though it might be diﬃ  cult to think how it would come about without good 
skill, since it is extremely improbable that one would make a good watch by 
chance).23 Even if one accepts that this could indeed be true for some artifacts, 
it certainly could not be used as a general rule. A healed patient is a good 
product of medicine, whether the doctor is skillful or not, Aristotle would 
claim. But could a patient who suﬀ ers little through a long sickbed to death 
not also be considered a good “artifact” of a doctor, even if in this case the 
dying patient could not be considered to be   υ ἔχει ἐν αὑτῳ? Th e same kind of 
argument could probably be applied to other arts. In order to know how good 
a work of skillful production was, one would have to take into account the 
means available to the producer and the constraints under which the produc-
tion had to be accomplished.
Th us, it seems possible to me to draw skill and virtue still closer than they 
seem to be, according to Aristotle. My point is not to collapse the distinction 
between (ethical) virtue and skill but to show that (at least in the passage 
examined) Aristotle’s valid eﬀ ort to make an important distinction leads him 
to exaggerate the diﬀ erence. Th is certainly is not an exhaustive discussion of 
the issue at hand. And it would be possible to indicate another voice in Aris-
totle, closer to mine.24 Richard Kraut’s reading of βουλευσις (deliberation) 
would support such a reading. He makes a distinction between a superior and 
an inferior form of deliberation in  the Nicomachean Ethics, where the superior 
version leads to virtuous choices (in the domain of πρᾶξις), but where recog-
nition is given to the inferior one as the highest form of reﬂ ection in the 
domain of ποίησις. Th is is done with reference to the hierarchy of doctors 
(taken by Kraut from the Politics): the lowest is a δημιουργός who does not 
23) I am thinking here of a single craftsman. It is unfortunately not diﬃ  cult to imagine a skill-
fully produced artifact in which demands on the skill of a number of individuals might be very 
limited. One could think, for instance, of the work of laborers in car manufacturing plants who 
have been submitted to Fordist or Taylorist labor strategies. But I think that such a situation 
could be considered as one in which the skill of the workers has been suspended—or reduced in 
the phenomenological sense: put in brackets, incapacitated, without perhaps eliminating it as a 
potential. In any case, in such a motorcar construction plant, the real “technicians” would be the 
managers and engineers.
24) On deliberation in the τεχναί see for instance EN 1112b29–32—what Aristotle writes here 
about βουλευσις, I have drawn into προαίρεσις, justifying myself with the deﬁ nition of 
προαίρεσις as ὄρεξις βουλευτική.
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posses a τέχνη, since he simply follows the pattern provided by someone else, 
without being able to engage intelligently with his matter; the second is one 
who is educated and better capable than the former to follow the real artisan’s 
recommendations; the third has studied (anatomy for instance) and alone has 
the intellectual virtue of τέχνη.25 Th e knowledge and deliberation involved in 
skill are thus presented here as “signiﬁ cant intellectual accomplishments” that 
require knowledge of rules but also originality and suppleness in their applica-
tion in changing circumstances, with a proper understanding of the set goal 
guiding the process (ibid., 289).26 
It seems clear then, that in the domain of production, this form of delib-
eration brings the nature of τέχνη much closer to that of virtues than could the 
mere repetition of simple tasks without any deliberation. It is this closeness 
that makes it possible to deﬁ ne both πρᾶξις and ποίησις (even when distin-
guishing them) as being dispositions following reason (ὣστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου 
ἕξις πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἕξεως [EN 1140a3–5]). I 
would not hesitate to say that just as is the case with virtue as ἕξις προαιρετική, 
skill is then also based on a ἕξις, which, since it is formed by πολλάκις πράττειν, 
sometimes from early childhood, could equally be said to be cultivated or 
taught through habituation (ἐθιζειν), provided that by doing so we do not 
forget about the inventiveness and adaptability that characterizes the acquired 
skill in its excellent form. Furthermore, that the ἕξις ποιητική is a disposition 
not only for action but for giving form to the emotions (as is the case with the 
ἕξις πρακτική) could be illustrated by the importance of mastering frustration 
and boredom, the practice of patience and perseverance in the technical life. I 
need not go into examples of this.27 
Th e preceding analysis and argumentation with Aristotle render it at least 
provisionally plausible to say that moral virtue and skill, although the distinc-
tion has not been suspended, share: 1) its installation through exercise over a 
long time, 2) its sharpening through exercise thereof and by the social input of 
sanctions, etc., 3) the fact of having the form of which one could speak in 
general terms, but where the rules have to be constantly applied to the situa-
25) Cf. R. Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy, 287–88.
26) Cf. EN 1112b8–13: “Deliberation then is employed in matters which, though subject to 
rules that generally hold good, are uncertain in their issue; or where the issue is indeterminate, 
and where, when the matter is important, we take others into our deliberations, distrusting our 
own capacity to decide. And we deliberate not about ends, but about means.” Th e absence of 
deliberation about ends will be problematized later in this essay.
27) Th e question of ἕξις will be pursued further in §3 of this article.
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tion, by the relevant agent, in the way in which the wise person or the master 
artisan would have done.
If Aristotle exaggerated the diﬀ erence between the ἀρεταί and the τεχναί (as 
I have argued), Heidegger not only follows his lead but drives the two even 
further apart.
2.2 Techné: From Aristotle to Heidegger
Th e ﬁ rst way in which Heidegger does so is by giving a very speciﬁ c presenta-
tion of τέχνη. It is of course not in τέχνη itself that Heidegger is interested; he 
aims at showing how τέχνη is the ground for an εἶδος-oriented interpretation 
of being.28 Th is would in turn serve to unmask the metaphysics of presence 
inscribed in Western metaphysics. 
In §19 of GA 18, “Th e φυσικός and his kind of treatment of the ψυχή” 
(Der φυσικός und seine Art der Behandlung der ψυχή), the ﬁ rst book of the 
Parts of Animals is used to explore the central tenets of Greek ontology. Being, 
for the Greeks, meant being-present (Gegenwärtigsein) by being produced 
(Hergestelltsein) in the sense of being completed (Fertigsein).29 If one desires to 
understand this ontology, one thus will have to explore how the production 
(Herstellen, ποίησις) and the λόγος that governs it (namely, τέχνη) imply both 
completion or end (τέλος) and presence (implied in the notion of εἶδος). Th is 
Heidegger does in §19c(α) entitled “Th e ἔργα τέχνης and the λόγος of the 
τέχνη.” Th e same train of thought is found in GA 19, §7, and I shall use this 
later text (lectures from a half year later in the winter of 1924–1925) to pres-
ent Heidegger’s ideas of the GA 18, §19, since the GA 19 text brings to the 
fore more clearly the elements essential to my argument in GA 18. 
28) See the subtitle of GA 19, §7c: “νόησις und ποίησις. Die τέχνη als Boden der Auslegung des 
Seins durch das εἶδος.” On this text, see Volpi, “Der Bezug zu Platon und Aristoteles in 
Heideggers Fundamental verständnis der Technik” (which also situates this theme within 
Heidegger’s whole philosophy of technics) and Taminiaux, “Poiesis et Praxis dans l’articulation de 
l’ontologie fondamentale” 112–17. A more recent treatment of the subject has been given by 
Bogdan Mincăse: “Das Modell der Herstellung. Über den Bezug techné—eidos—logos in M. 
Heideggers Interpretationen zu Aristoteles,” Studia phaenomenologica 4, no. 1–2 (2004): 127–
50, see in particular his overview of the theme (based primarily on GA 24) in pp. 127–37.
29) Cf. GA 18: 219. See also GA 18: 214 where Heidegger clariﬁ es the vocabulary: “Bedeutung 
von Sein als Gegenwärtigsein; Sein: Da-sein in der Gegenwart. . . . das Da für die Griechen besagt: 
In-das-Da-Gekommensein, und zwar durch die Her-stellen; Her: Da, Her is ein bestimmtes Da; 
her-stellen: in das Da bringen, in die Gegenwart. Das ist der eigentliche Sein der ποίησις. 
Dasein ist im eigentlichen Sinne Hergestelltsein, d.h. Fertig-Dasein, Zu-Ende-Gekommensein.”
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Th is paragraph (GA 19, §7) opens by explaining that in τέχνη one has to do 
with an object that is still becoming (Sein-Werdende, ἐσόμενον). Th e principle 
or point of departure (ἀρχή) of this object (the ποιητον) has an aim (τέλος) 
outside itself and is brought about for some use by someone (πρός τι καὶ τινὸς 
[EN 1139b2–3]). Th is nonnatural way of becoming thus originates in a point 
of τέλος departure that is a form or plan, design, or image that is located in the 
soul (το εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ [Metaphysics 1132b1]) and this εἶδος becomes the 
axis around which Heidegger works out his interpretation of τέχνη. In this 
way τέχνη is an ἀληθεύειν (Aufdecken): it lets one see what has to be brought 
about or produced (GA 19: 42). One starts to see what Heidegger’s perspective 
on this τέχνη is, when he then pursues: “And what is uncovered here in the 
soul and what is present in it, is the εἶδος of the house, the appearance, the 
‘sight’ of the house, how it should eventually stand there and what makes up 
its true presence” (GA 19: 42; my italics).30 But the presence of this εἶδος ἐν τῇ 
ψυχῇ is anticipated (vorweggenommen) by what Heidegger himself calls 
προαίρεσις: what has to be produced is presentiﬁ ed (vergegenwärtigt) in the 
εἶδος. Th us Heidegger could describe the εἶδος as “ἀρχή of the κίνησις of the 
τέχνη as a whole” (GA 19: 44).31 In this way we arrive at §7c with its aim of 
indicating τέχνη as the ground for an εἶδος-oriented metaphysics of being.
In this subparagraph Heidegger develops an image of τέχνη that has been 
warped with the help of Metaphysics VII, 7 to suit his ontological objective. 
Aristotle acts here as a good accomplice, since the image of τέχνη presented 
here is already much less sophisticated and convincing than what could 
be found in Nicomachean Ethics III, 3 (that I have read in §2.1 above). In the 
paragraph from the Metaphysics, Aristotle uses the doctor as example of the 
technician to assert that ἡ δὲ ὑγίεια ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λόγος—for the doctor, 
the health of the patient is the reason (in his/her ψυχή) for the practice of heal-
ing. Heidegger then in turn claims that this λόγος means λεγόμενον. Th is is 
contrasted with another citation of Aristotle where λόγος means λέγειν,32 that 
30) “Und was hier in der Seele aufgedeckt wird und in ihr präsent ist, das is das εἶδος des Hauses, 
das Aussehen, das “Gesicht” des Hauses, wie es einmal dastehen soll und welches seine eigent-
liche Anwesenheit ausmacht.”
31) Th is formula comes from the title of §7c. See also the same page: “In der τέχνη ist das εἶδος ἐν 
τῇ ψυχῆ die ἀρχή der κίνησις, welche zunächst die der νόησις und sodann die der ποίησις ist.” 
32) Th e citation is from De partibus animalium 640a 31f: ἡ δὲ τέχνη λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ὁ ἂνευ 
ὕλης ἐστίν, which is commented on in more detail in GA 18: 222, where Heidegger translates: 
“Die τέχνη [nicht das Hersetellen selbst, sondern eine Art der ἐπιστήμη als Sichauskennen hin-
sichtlich des Herzustellenden] ist ein λόγος dessen, was gemacht werden soll, des ἔργον, ein 
Ansprechen, das ohne die ὕλη ist, ohne den Stoﬀ .”
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is, “discussing presentiﬁ cation” (besprechendes Vergegenwärtigen [GA 19: 45]). 
But the λόγος from the Metaphysics passage is λεγόμενον, which is nothing 
other than the εἶδος previously discussed, which in turn is, according to Hei-
degger, nothing other than the Platonic Idea. And thus Heidegger could con-
clude that “τέχνη is λόγος qua λέγειν of the λεγόμενον, i.e. of the εἶδος” (GA 
19: 45) and that this εἶδος is ﬁ rst present in the νόησις and then in the 
ποίησις.33 It is this ποίησις (Herstellen) that has been said at the beginning to 
aim at an end (τέλος). Th ere is then complicity between the end and the image 
or plan, such that the plan is the anticipation of what is to be ﬁ nished oﬀ .34 
We have here the basic ingredients for a criticism of the representational 
notion of truth, for a criticism of the metaphysics of presence. But do we have 
a credible representation of technical life? Let us go over Heidegger’s chain of 
ideas again. Two links should be examined closer. 
Th e ﬁ rst one is his decision to interpret λόγος (in the citation from Aristo-
tle) to mean λεγόμενον or λέγειν of a λεγόμενον. Th e introduction of the 
substantiﬁ ed past participle (it is not explicitly used in the text to which Hei-
degger refers) does not seem to me to be imposed by the subject matter (though 
the text of Aristotle might allow such a reading). By insisting on reducing the 
λόγος of τέχνη to what has been reasoned (λεγόμενον), Heidegger eﬀ ectively 
moves in the direction of aligning the technical procedure with the original 
plan. Th is is explicitly stated in GA 18: “From the How of the image [i.e., 
Heidegger’s translation of εἶδος.—EW] of the ﬁ nished thing, from its being-
anticipated, is laid out the type, the order and the direction of the procedure 
of production.”35 By so doing, he tends to reduce the scope of technical actions 
33) Cf. GA 19: 45: “Das εἶδος, das aufgedeckt und verwahrt ist in der οἰκοδομική, ist ἀρχή der 
κίνησις, welche zunächst die der νόησις und sodann die der ποίησις ist.”
34) Th is idea of εἶδος (design) that Heidegger derives from Aristotle is very close to that of Marx, 
when in Das Kapital (book 1, chapter V) he explains what human labor is in contradistinction 
to the activity of animals: “Wir unterstellen die Arbeit in einer Form, worin sie dem Menschen 
ausschließlich angehört. Eine Spinne verrichtet Tätigkeiten, die denen des Webers ähneln, und 
eine Biene beschämt durch den Bau ihrer Wachszellen manchen menschlichen Baumeister. Was 
aber von vornherein den schlechtesten Baumeister vor der besten Biene auszeichnet, ist, daß er 
die Zelle in seinem Kopf gebaut hat, bevor er sie in Wachs baut” (my italics) (Das Kapital. Kritik der 
politischen Ökonomie. K. Marx, F. Engels, Werke, Band 23 [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974], 193).
35) GA 18: 221: “Aus dem Wie des Aussehens des fertigen Seienden in seinem Vorweggenom-
mensein ist vorgezeichnet Gangart, Gangfolge und Gangrichtung der Herstellung.” Th is 
portrayal of the technical procedure seems to me incompatable with that presented in GA 19, 
§8, pp. 53–54 in which Heidegger comments on EN 1140b23–25, and especially Aristotle’s 
distinction between virtue and skill in a statement of which the translation is hard to give: “and 
in skill someone that willingly errs is preferable [to someone that errs unwillingly], whereas in 
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to that of the least impressive of the technicians, the δημιουργός, whose work 
is characterized by the attempt to follow closely the advice or design of a mas-
ter, since he restricts the working of the βουλευσις that allows for innovation 
and adaptation in the master craftsman.36 Th e importance of the reciprocal 
adaptation of design and execution, of which the master craftsman should be 
capable, should not be underestimated. But Heidegger, on the other hand, 
instead of recognizing this feedback loop in τέχνη between εἶδος and ποίησις, 
seems to let τέχνη slip from an ἀληθεύειν concentrating on things that change, 
namely, the ποιητα, to being anchored as an ἀληθεύειν of what, in his mind, 
does not (at least for the duration of the project), namely, the εἶδος. Th is 
accent on programmation has the advantage for his ontological argument that 
the temporality of things is seized or ﬁ xed. Th e perfectum character of pro-
grammatic production is of course reinforced by the acquaintedness that an 
artisan would have with a particular task. Hence the being-anticipated (Vorweg-
genommensein) that is the having (Haben) as habit and habitat of the craftsman 
(to which reference has been made above),37 again without reference to the 
process by which this acquaintedness (skill) has been acquired through exer-
cise and teaching from others. And if one were to ask where this perfectum, 
this Haben, comes from, what the origin of this λεγόμενον of the technical 
life is, the only hint is the technical deliberation to which Heidegger refers 
and that, as we shall see later, aims at excluding all deliberation. But, even if 
prudence it is the worst, and the same holds also for the other virtues” (καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ 
ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος, περὶ δέ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὧσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς). 
In Heidegger’s reading of this phrase, the capacity to miss the mark intentionally (Fehlgehenkön-
nen) that manifests itself in the repeated attempt to try is exactly constitutive of technical skill, 
since it is only by trying that the certainty of the art is acquired and the stiﬀ ened technique, the 
ﬁ rm process, is shatterd (zerbricht). Insofar as Heidegger overstates his point, by claiming that 
“Th e τέχνη will proceed surer when it risks the attempt by error” (Die τέχνη wird um so sicherer 
gehen, wenn sie einen Fehlversuch riskiert [GA 19: 54]), he misses Aristotle’s point: the latter only 
means that whereas prudence reveals no excellence in deliberate error, the technical show-oﬀ , for 
instance, could still demonstrate considerable technical skill even by not doing the appropriate 
action. However, Heidegger’s claim about the heuristic and training merits of trying in technical 
life should be considered valid. In fact, one would have to ask why this trying—which could be 
nothing else than a practical deliberation—did not appear so clearly to him elsewhere where he 
portrayed skill, for instance in his reﬂ ection on exercise (see discussion later), and where he saw 
nothing of technical training by means of trying but only by means of the interiorization of 
prescriptions and the elimination of deliberation. 
36) In the passage of our discussion the question of deliberation (βουλευσις) is not touched on. 
In it, Heidegger translates τέχνη with deliberation (Überlegung).
37) See my remarks above on Kisiel “From Intuition to Understanding,” 181–82.
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one were to concede that there is an εἶδος as λεγόμενον behind every techni-
cal action, the introduction of a λόγος as λέγειν of a λεγόμενον would neces-
sarily tend to favor an idea of technical life that corresponds more to its most 
modest ﬁ gure, the δημιουργός, from whom the least eﬀ ort and skill of adap-
tation between design and execution is expected; at the same time the her-
meneutic nature of the mature skill of the master craftsman who is best 
capable of giving reason (λόγος) for what he/she is doing, as well as the pro-
cess by which this skill is acquired, are obscured. My point would be still 
stronger if one accepts my argument above that Aristotle is mistaken not to 
allow for debate as to the ends of the τεχναί, as one should, on the basis of 
the ends-means feed-back loop.
Th e second link in Heidegger’s chain of ideas to be questioned is equating 
λόγος as λεγόμενον with εἶδος. Th is move is needed in the economy of Hei-
degger’s text, to indicate the correspondence between τέχνη, presence, and 
representation. What this does for the picture he paints of technical life, 
however, is to reduce the giving of reason in this domain to having an image, 
pattern, or design of the ﬁ nal product. Perhaps this tends to be true for an 
assistant who mechanically executes simple repetitive tasks. But it holds true 
neither for the apprentice nor even for the master craftsman, and this, even 
when no negotiation of the aim or εἶδος is required during the process of 
production. Very often in production there is a tension between the image 
or design of what is to be brought about and what is achievable within the 
limits set by contingent constraints. Aristotle hints at this in Book 1 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics (EN 1098a30–32) where he illustrates the varying degree 
of precision attainable in diﬀ erent disciplines by comparing the carpenter 
and the geometer: both seek to attain a precise geometrical ﬁ gure (ἡ ορθή, 
but this is nothing diﬀ erent from the ideal τέλος or εἶδος), but whereas 
exactness is quintessential to the geometer, the carpenter is content with 
approximating this ﬁ gure to the degree demanded by his work (πρὸς τὸ 
ἔργον). What a precise geometrical ﬁ gure (a straight line or a right angle) is, 
is the same for both. Th e carpenter, in his/her design of a piece of furniture, 
would have an ideal in mind in which only right angles and straight lines 
ﬁ gure, even though he/she knows very well that contingent factors (under-
developed skill, the nature of the material, time constraints, and the like) 
would make it impossible in reality to bring that geometrical ﬁ gure about in 
the production of the piece of furniture; in the ﬁ nal product there would be 
only approximations of the geometrical ﬁ gures. It does not mean that the 
carpenter has from the outset a crooked, imperfect, or approximated εἶδος 
in mind; knowing that the product will not correspond perfectly to the 
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design does not mean the same as having an imperfect design in mind. Th e 
crooked line, the imperfect joint, in the ﬁ nal product is part of no εἶδος. But 
it does not come as a complete surprise either. In other words the λεγόμενον 
that justiﬁ es the way of working aspires to an εἶδος and most often cannot 
forsee in what way exactly this εἶδος will not be attained. Th e reason given 
for “the type, the order and the direction of the procedure of production,” 
i.e., the λεγόμενον, is not the same as the εἶδος. To say that the εἶδος and the 
λεγόμενον are the same thing is to claim that the craftsman aimed at an 
imperfect product from the outset (but in such a way that the precise imper-
fection was known to him/her beforehand), which would in practice exclude 
the aspiration to an improved execution.38 Th e εἶδος and λεγόμενον tend to 
overlap the more mechanical, repetitive, and simple a task becomes. But in 
master craftsmanship and in complex arts, the εἶδος informs the λεγόμενον 
without determining the process of production completely. Whereas contin-
gent constraints make the attainment of the εἶδος impossible, through exer-
cise, improvement of instruments, the luxury of suﬃ  cient time and energy, 
one could acquire the skill to approximate it more and more closely. Th is is 
what ambitious craftsmen strive for. But the question of the quality of work-
manship—a constant concern for good craftsmen—does not enter into con-
sideration for Heidegger. 
By following the same distinction of the λεγόμενον and the εἶδος, one 
would be able to give a more complete account of the phenomenon of style in 
workmanship. Whereas one would, by following Heidegger, have to reduce 
technical style to being an aspect of what is programmed in the technical 
εἶδος, the distinction that I propose would make it possible to take into con-
sideration the constant ἕξις of the artisan and inventivity in the spur of the 
moment by the artisan that, in combination, account for aspects of an indi-
vidual’s or a school’s style beyond the εἶδος.
It seems then that even though I do not deny that very often τέχνη has an 
εἶδος as its ἀρχή that anticipates the τέλος, it does not mean that in technical 
life there is always an εἶδος as a clearly deﬁ ned idea or an accomplished, 
ﬁ nished-oﬀ  plan or program, or that it is necessarily present in the mind and 
38) What is said here with the example of the carpenter should be complemented by EN 1104a7–
10 (which will be discussed below), where Aristotle indicates that there is no τέχνη that could 
determine what the τεχνΐτης should do in every particular circumstance. Having a general 
knowledge of the ﬁ eld of work (τέχνη) informs the craftsman in a particular situation but it is 
not a question of simply applying the rules—it is a question of hermeneutically engaging with 
the situation in order to ﬁ nd the appropriate technical μεσότης.
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of which the execution would approach a “reading” of this script,39 without 
any question about the attainability of a reasonable design. 
Whether this deformed presentation of τέχνη is to be attributed more to 
Aristotle or more to Heidegger is of no importance to me here. But once this 
caricatural picture of technical life has been accepted, it is much easier to fol-
low Heidegger in exaggerating the distinction between τέχνη and ἀρετή. I 
shall still have to turn my attention to virtue and in particular to that aspect 
that is the most immediately aﬀ ected by what one thinks of the relation 
between ἀρεταί and τεχναί and thus the nature of τέχνη, namely, ἕξις, in 
order to argue why the life of πρᾶξις for its part is much more technical than 
Heidegger concedes.
3. Hexis (Disposition)
Heidegger repeatedly states that his objective for discussing Aristotle’s Grund-
begriﬀ  of ἕξις (disposition) is that it allows us to gain a better understanding 
of πάθος. Th ough there is no reason to deny that Heidegger does indeed use 
his analysis of ἕξις in this way, it will become apparent from the following 
discussion that this analysis opens up to the Heideggerian “ethics,” which it 
makes possible to a large extent. Ἕξις is the place where the road of Jemeinig-
keit or Jeweiligkeit splits into its authentic and its inauthentic modes. Th e road 
to inauthenticity will carry the Greek name ποίησις, and the way of authentic-
ity, that of πρᾶξις.40  Th us the ἕξις will lead us to a number of themes that will 
remain important in Sein und Zeit, especially Entschlossenheit and Eigentlich-
keit, that will be so decisive for the way in which Heidegger conceived of the 
relation between Dasein and its equals. My own concern with this theme, 
however, lies neither in the emotions nor in the authentic existence but in the 
perspective proposed in it on technicity. I shall read Heidegger’s rendering of 
ἕξις in the ethical virtues to ﬁ nally gain access to an understanding of ἕξις that 
is not only a ἕξις πρακτική, but also a ἕξις ποιητική.41 Once again, my objec-
tive is not to suspend the distinction but to show how this distinction has been 
exaggerated by Heidegger and from there to question his presentation of the 
ἕξις προαιρετική, the Entschlossenheit.
39) Cf. Heidegger’s use of the word Vorschrift (instruction) that could be read etimologically as I 
indicate.
40) I herein agree with Taminiaux; see his “Poiesis et Praxis dans l’articulation de l’ontologie fon-
damentale.”
41) See my appropriation of the ἕξις πρακτικὴ and ἕξις ποιητική in EN 1140a3–5 above.
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As in the previous section, I shall start here by providing an orientation to 
the theme as I read it in Aristotle, before moving on to §17 of GA 18 that 
covers the ἕξις.
3.1 Aristotle on Hexis 
In the preceding section, I examined the distinction between virtue and skill. 
Aristotle was obliged to explain himself on this topic, since the two terms are 
so closely related. Th is closeness is illustrated by the number of analogies that 
he used to explain the process of virtue acquisition. Let us go back to an 
important point in Aristotle’s explanation of this process. He anticipates the 
critical question about what it means that in order to become virtuous, one 
must perform virtuous actions (EN 1105a16–18). Th e solution to this ques-
tion, which is a center piece of the Aristotelian functional argument, consists 
in distinguishing two ways of acting virtuously and in indicating what they 
represent for one another. Two people do the same virtuous action, but for the 
one this means doing the kind of action that a virtuous person would, whereas 
for the other it means doing it as a virtuous person would.42 Th e backbone of 
Aristotle’s theory of virtue acquisition consists in arguing that it is by acting as 
the ﬁ rst person does that we learn to act like the second (though acting like the 
second is never guaranteed). We ﬁ nd here a situation similar to that present in 
the acquisition of skill: one could do the right thing by simply following the 
instruction or pattern (this is what the δημιουργός or the apprentice does); or 
one could practice an art as the master craftsman does, namely, from a well- 
established disposition (but without any guarantees) to do the right thing. 
If this is how virtue is acquired, virtue is to be deﬁ ned as follows: “Virtue, 
then, is a state involving rational choice, consisting in a mean relative to us 
and determined by reason—the reason, that is, by reference to which the prac-
tically wise person would determine it. It is a mean between two vices, one of 
excess, the other of deﬁ ciency.” (ἔστιν ἂρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν 
μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμας, ὡρισμενῃ λογῳ καὶ ὡς ἄν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. 
μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δε κατε ἔλλειψιν [EN 
1106b36–1107a2]).43 Th is is what the virtuous person “disposes of”; but the 
virtue apprentice, though he/she would be able to steer towards the mean 
42) Cf. M. Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, 104.
43) Translation of Roger Crisp, in the Cambridge texts in the history of philosophy series (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). A more literal translation is given by Terence Irwin 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985): “Virtue, then, is a state that decides, con-
sisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is deﬁ ned by reference to reason, i.e. to the 
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between two vices, lacks the state, the disposition, the ἕξις, to do so, like the 
φρονίμος would. It is evident that the notion of ἕξις is central to this deﬁ ni-
tion and thus to the solution oﬀ ered by Aristotle to the criticism anticipated. 
Ἕξις is what distinguishes the virtuous person, from someone who is not yet 
but strives to become one. Taken on its own, however, it is not a term that 
would suﬃ  ce to make the distinction between the virtuous person and the 
vicious one, since one could have a ἕξις that disposes towards vice. Hence the 
importance of the complete deﬁ nition.
Th e ἕξις is characterized 1) as having a hold on something (this is the ele-
ment of ﬁ rmness, steadiness or stability), 2) as being possessed, rather than 
used (it is a potential that could remain hidden), and 3) as a persistent orienta-
tion or disposition that could be more passive (in the sense of being mere 
reaction) or more active (striving to realize an objective).44 Th ese are all quali-
ties that are also associated with acquired skill; in fact, we have already referred 
to EN 1104a where Aristotle clearly distinguishes ποίησις and πρᾶξις, but in 
the same passage he insists that there is no skill that is not a state or disposition 
to make or produce, and this with the involvement of reason (οὐδεμία οὔτε 
τέχνη ἐστὶν ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις ἐστίν [EN 1104a9–10]). It seems 
then that an acquired ἕξις or even a ἕξις μετὰ λόγου does not distinguish vir-
tue from skill.
Th e determination of the virtuous ἕξις as directed at the mean between 
extremes also provides us with material for further comparison. Th is mean, as 
is well known, is no universal principle; it has two aspects of relativity: it is 
πρὸς ἡμας, relative to us 1) in the sense of who we are and 2) relative to the 
range of particular qualities of possible actions within a given situation in 
which we ﬁ nd ourselves. Th e relativity to us consists in determining the mean 
by the agent’s degree of expertise or experience, with reference to human 
nature and to the age, gender, and position with regard to the freedom of the 
agent.45 If it could be shown that the guiding idea of the mean is indeed appli-
cable to skill too and not only to virtue, then these determinations of the mean 
πρὸς ἡμας would certainly apply to the craftsman too. I wish to suggest not 
that the ἕξις of ποίησις could be reduced to its seeking of the mean (in any 
case, virtue is not exclusively concerned with the mean either, as is indicated 
by Aristotle in cases of murder, adultery, theft, etc.), nor that the ἕξις  ποιητική 
reason by reference to which the intelligent person would deﬁ ne it. It is a mean between two 
vices, one of excess and one of deﬁ ciency.”
44) Cf. Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, 107.
45) Cf. Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, 113.
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should be conceived of as means-seeking to the same extent as in the case of 
ἀρετή, but that a similar structure is not foreign to the ἕξις of τέχνη. In order 
then to argue this point, let us examine the second aspect of relativity of the 
mean, namely, that it is relative to the particularities of possible action in the 
situation of practice.46 Th e mean is deﬁ ned as not a mathematical mean but as 
the right proportion to be established on a range of “distinguishable incre-
ments” of all the adverbial possibilities of an emotional or practical response 
to a situation. Th ese adverbial possibilities are the range of possibilities con-
cerning the agent, object, instrument, manner, time, place, duration, reason 
and purpose. Th us, for every possible action in a particular situation there is a 
range of possible determinations of each of these adverbial aspects of the 
sought action and the combination of these will make up the response to a 
given situation. Virtue is having the disposition to choose the appropriate 
ratio, the mean, of each of the adverbial possibilities that determine action.
If one accepts this complex version of the doctrine of the mean borrowed 
from Michael Pakaluk, then one would be obliged to acknowledge that in 
technical action too, one is always confronted with the choice of the distin-
guishable increments of the agent, object, instrument, manner, etc. of a par-
ticular technical action.47 And if this is conceded, then the doctrine of the 
mean applies to skill and thus the determinations of who the artisan is, is also 
determined πρὸς ἡμας, as I set out to show.48
I do not believe that my analyses amount to eliminating the distinction 
between ἕξις ποιητική and the ἕξις πρακτική. But it does seem to suggest that 
the two notions suﬃ  ciently overlap to consider them as two derivatives of one 
human ἕξις. Th e acquisition of such a ἕξις would take place from the earliest 
childhood by good or bad, implicit or explicit education and social sanction. 
Th e virtuous person or the virtuoso has acquired a disposition to deliberative 
choices relative to himself/herself and relative to the particulars of the action 
to be undertaken. Furthermore, it could not be excluded that a ἕξις for virtue 
could be partially learned by practicing a related skill: temperance or self-
mastery acquired in the carpenter’s workshop, on the sports ﬁ eld, or in the 
piano room might translate very easily in a practice of temperance or self-
mastery; the badly acquired virtue (or the vice) of irascibility would impair the 
46) Here I follow  M. Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, p. 110–11.
47) Th ough one would have to qualify the last element, the purpose, since the οὗ ἕνεκα is 
inscribed in the essence of practice as it could not be inscribed in production.
48) Th is conclusion has been anticipated by my interpretation above of the precision of technical 
work as being determined πρὸς τὸ ἔργον (see my discussion in sec. 2.2 above of Aristotle’s com-
parison of precision for the geometer and for the carpenter).
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apprentice craftsman to surmount the initial diﬃ  culties in acquiring a particu-
lar skill.
In the reading of Heidegger that follows, we shall see that his reading of 
Aristotle takes him in the opposite direction from what I propose, in line with 
his exaggerated distinction between skill and virtue: ἕξις is, according to him, 
ἕξις, not of ποίησις, but of πρᾶξις .49
3.2 Hexis: From Aristotle to Heidegger
Heidegger executes this ﬁ ne separation by a strategy of forming his own notion 
of ἕξις (not a ἕξις ποιητική but ἕξις πρακτική) with the exclusion of a number 
of qualities of Aristotle’s ἕξις, in particular, those that would be shared by a ἕξις 
ποιητική. Th is is done in service of laying out two modes of existence that 
would at the same time be two ways of existing relative to the others. Let us 
have a look at how Heidegger “destructs” Aristotle’s notion of ἕξις.
Heidegger’s discussion of ἕξις in GA 18, §17, is to be read within the setting 
of the third chapter of part one. Its theme is clearly formulated in the title 
“Th e interpretation of human existence with respect to the fundamental pos-
sibility of speaking-with-one-another following the main theme of the Rheto-
ric” (Die Auslegung des Daseins des Menschen hinsichtlich der Grundmöglichkeit 
des Miteinandersprechens am Leitfaden der Rhetorik) and is made possible by 
Heidegger’s conviction that “the Rhetoric is nothing but the interpretation of 
concrete [human] existence, the hermeneutics of [human] existence itself ” 
(Die Rhetorik ist nichts anderes als die Auslegung des konkreten Daseins, die 
Hermeneutik des Daseins selbst [GA 18: 110]). Still in Sein und Zeit the Rhetoric 
is presented in this way, namely, as “the ﬁ rst systematic hermeneutics of the 
everydayness of being-with-one-another” (die erste systematische Hermeneutik 
der Alltäglichkeit des Miteinanderseins [SZ 138]). However, the Rhetoric moves 
to the background in §17 in favor of passages from the Metaphysics and the 
Nicomachean Ethics, but it remains the décor against which this paragraph is 
to be read—the perspective on the authentic existence with which this para-
graph concludes will indicate what the conditions are for individual action, 
independent of the inﬂ uence of others, and will thus anticipate the singular-
izing aspect of authenticity in Sein und Zeit.
Th e discussion of ἕξις (§17) is embedded in that of πάθη (in §§16 and 18). 
Th e former notion is introduced with the aim of using that which is more 
transparent (i.e., the ἕξις) in order to elucidate that which is less transparent 
49) For the purposes of the present essay I shall leave out the ἕξις ἐπιστημική.
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(i.e. the πάθη).50 Furthermore, if the πάσχειν of the πάθη is the opposite of the 
activity of ποιεῖν and thus they represent the two extremes in the research of 
κίνησις (i.e., Sein im Sinne des Bewegtseins, being in the sense of being-moved 
[GA 18: 172]), then by implication, as we shall see, ἔχειν and ἕξις take a 
middle position between πάσχειν and ποιεῖν.51 But in the part of GA 18 under 
discussion, the πάθη is presented as something that co-determines the mean-
ing of a λόγος of the speaker; the λόγος has its ground (Boden) in πάθη (GA 
18: 177), the fundamental reason for this being that the emotions are the how 
of being-in-the-world (Die πάθη charakterisieren ganz allgemein eine Beﬁ nd-
lichkeit des Menschen, ein Wie des Seins-in-der-Welt  [GA 18: 178]). But emo-
tions change (as under the inﬂ uence of rhetoric) and thus a being-in-the-world 
could be entirely redirected by such a change in emotion. But the possibility 
of holding or grasping (fassen)52 emotions also exists and that is exactly where 
the ἕξις (disposition) comes into play.
Heidegger starts his exposition of the double Aristotelian Grundbegriﬀ , 
ἕξις/ἔχειν, in GA 18, §17, by synthesizing a deﬁ nition of ἔχειν from its four 
diﬀ erent uses presented by Aristotle in Book 4 of the Metaphysics. According 
to this deﬁ nition, ἔχειν, when said of a being, characterizes it as “being out 
after a determined possibility of being or its negation, but which is in the sense 
of the negation the same: the withholding from being appropriately as something 
could be” (GA 18: 174).53 Subsequently, ἕξις “means in this ontological context 
50) According to Heidegger’s declaration of his “general hermeneutical theme” (allgemeinen 
hermeneutischen Leitfadens [GA 18: 177]). Cf. also the title of §18a: “Th e ἕξις as main theme for 
the understanding of the structure of being of πάθος” (Die ἕξις als Leitfaden für die Fassung der 
Seinsstruktur des πάθος [GA 18: 191]).
51) Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s κίνησις in the Physics, that covers the whole of the second 
part of GA 18, balances the ﬁ rst part in which Dasein as λόγον ἔχον is analyzed, in order to 
form a uniﬁ ed ontological argument of this series of lectures. Whereas I concentrate on the ﬁ rst 
part of GA 18, a commentary on the second part has been worked out by Charlotta Weigelt in 
“Logos as Kinesis: Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Physics in Grundbegriﬀ e der aristotelischen 
Philosophie,” Epoché  9, no.1, (Fall 2004): 101–16. For a global reading of the early Heidegger’s 
reappropriation of Aristotle’s κίνησις, see Jussi Backmann, “Divine and Mortal Motivation: On 
the Movement of Life in Aristotle and Heidegger,” Continental Philosophy Review 38 (2006): 
241–61.
52) Cf. GA 18: 180: “In der ἕξις wird sich das Dasein schärfer zeigen in seiner Jeweiligkeit. Sein 
des Menschen, menschliches Leben als Dasein ist jeweilig, im Augenblick: ἕξις ist ein Gefaßtsein 
des Daseins, orientiert auf den Augenblick.”
53) “Aussein auf eine bestimmte Seinsmöglichkeit oder seiner Negation, was aber im Sinne der 
Negation dasselbe ist: des Abhaltens davon, eigentlich zu sein, wie etwas sein möchte.” Th is “being 
out after” (aussein auf ) is the exact expression by which Heidegger characterized the facticial 
movement of life since the Natorp Bericht: “Der Grundsinn der faktischen Lebensbewegtheit ist 
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the appropriate being-present of the having as such” (bedeutet innerhalb dieses 
Seinszusammenhanges das eigentliche Gegenwärtigsein des Habens als solchen [GA 
18: 175]). Th is being-present (Gegenwärtigsein) of the ἕξις is to be understood 
as the in-between (μεταξύ) between the active bringing about of something 
and that something’s having been brought about;54 it is, according to Hei-
degger, no new determination of being (keine neue Seinsbestimmung [GA 18: 
175]); it is the mere being there (Da), namely, being there at the τέλος of the 
particular thing. Ἕξις is furthermore characterized by the fact of disposing ele-
ments in a certain order (διάθεσις). Th us far Heidegger has presented the ἕξις 
as a general ontological Grundbegriﬀ  applicable to the whole spectrum of beings 
from things to human beings, according to the aim laid down by him.55 But he 
then applies it to human beings, and in the move changes his mind to state that 
ἕξις, Haben, is indeed a determination of being (Seinsbestimmung).56
In accordance with the aim of the discussion of ἕξις, namely, the elucida-
tion of the πάθη, Heidegger can now proceed by stating that “[t]he πάθη can 
be had, in having resides a relation with being” (Die πάθη können gehabt 
werden, im Haben liegt eine Beziehung auf das Sein [GA 18: 177]). Th e link 
between ἕξις and πάθος imposes itself in a reading of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Book 2: according to Aristotle, the soul (or at least the part of the soul that is 
capable of reacting to reason) can bring about either πάθη or δυνάμεις or 
ἕξις.57 Here πάθη should be seen as actual emotion and δυνάμεις as the poten-
tial to have an emotion; ἕξις would then be the intermediary, the μεταξύ with 
relation to emotion.58 Th e relation to being (Beziehung auf das Sein) follows 
from Heidegger’s ontological understanding of the emotions as the how of 
being-in-the-world (cf. GA 18: 178). It thus follows that the ἕξις is a relation 
to being by the fact that it “expresses” a being-composed (Gefaßtsein)59 with 
regards to the how of the being-in-the-world. 
das Sorgen (curare). In dem gerichteten, sorgenden ‘Aussein auf etwas’ ist das Worauf der Sorge 
des lebens da, die jeweilige Welt” (NB 14).
54) Metaphysica 4.1022bﬀ .: ὅταν γὰρ τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποίησις μεταξύ (“when the 
one makes and the other is made, in between them is the fact of making”).
55) GA 18: 172: “Wir müssen sehen, worin die Mannigfaltigkeit der Bedeutungen des ἔχειν 
übereinkomt, inwiefern das ἔχειν Sein ausdrückt.”
56) GA 18: 176; cf. also 179, where ἕξις is called a “Grundbestimmung des Daseins des 
Menschen.”
57) EN 1105b19–21: ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστι, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξις, τούτων 
ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή.
58) Cf. Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, 105–6. 
59) Heidegger will exploit a number of elements from the semantic ﬁ eld of the root “fass-”: 
Fassung (composure); fassen (grasp, hold or grasp [ﬁ guratively], i.e., understand); gefaßt (calm, 
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However, in what follows in GA 18, §17, one quickly comes under the 
impression that Heidegger is interested in much more than an understanding 
of the emotions. He sets out to explore the ἕξις in the human being as genus 
of virtue (GA 18, §17c, introduction)60 and announces four fundamental 
aspects (Grundmomente) of the ontology of Dasein that will come to the fore 
by an exploration of this connection between ἕξις and ἀρετή:61 1) that doing 
(πρᾶξις) is concern (Besorgen) and, in particular, care of Dasein for itself; 2) the 
Jeweiligkeit of Dasein in the Augenblick; 3) while on average and mostly Dasein 
lingers in the extremes of the too much or too little, it has this Gefaßtsein that 
is a possibility that Dasein has seized from its always there position (aus seiner 
jeweiligen Lage); 4) the occasion for and the way of forming a ἕξις is to be 
situated in the Dasein itself. Th us, the ontological importance of ἕξις is indi-
cated early in §17c with reference to human existence (Dasein des Menschen) 
that is equated with πρᾶξις and, in particular, with reference to the καιρός of 
that πρᾶξις (cf. GA 18: 180). It should be noted that the stage is thus set to 
explore the ἕξις as a fundamental aspect of the ontology of Dasein by consid-
ering only the ἕξις πρακτική and without any consideration for the ἕξις 
ποιητική. Th us ἕξις could be considered exclusively in the perspective of Da-
sein’s concern for itself (while in interaction with the world and others). Fur-
thermore, ἕξις is explored in the genesis of ἀρετή in a context that is stamped 
(albeit by anticipation of §19) by the exaggerated distinction of ἀρετή from 
τέχνη; the ἀρετή of which the ἕξις is part of the genesis is an ἀρετή strictly 
devoid of everything technical. Chances for this reading of ἕξις to concede an 
aﬃ  nity to anything resembling technical life have been practically eliminated 
in advance. 
In order, then, to follow Heidegger’s development on the contribution of 
virtues and disposition to the understanding of Dasein, one has to remember 
that virtues are dispositions and the latter considered only as “being-composed 
with respect to the variety of states” (Gefaßtsein zu den verschiedenen Beﬁ nd-
lichkeiten [GA 18: 181]); virtues, or rather virtue (since Heidegger uses here 
only the singular), is a qualiﬁ cation of Dasein, not in the sense of a quality 
composed); gefaßt auf etwas (prepared for). Th e word Gefaßtsein should resound with these 
possibilities.
60) GA 18: 179: “Wir betrachten die ἕξις, sofern sie bezogen ist auf die ζωὴ ἀνθρώπου, auf die 
πρᾶξις μετὰ λόγου—ἕξις als das γένος der ἀρετή.” Jacques Taminaux, using especially GA 19, 
has worked out an interpretation of “Th e Interpretation of Aristotle’s Notion of Areté in 
Heidegger’s First Courses,” in Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, ed. F. Raﬀ oul and D. Pettigrew 
(Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 2002), 13–27.
61) Cf. GA 18: 180.
 E. Wolﬀ  / Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008) 317–357 343
(Eigenschaft), but as the adverbiality of the Sein of Dasein, that is, of the tem-
porality or extention in time (Zeitlichkeit, die Erstreckung in die Zeit [GA 18: 
181]). Th us, since Dasein exists temporally, its adverbiality (namely, ἀρετή) 
comes about only temporally, that is, according to Heidegger citing Aristotle, 
δι᾽ ἔθους, durch die Gewohnheit, through habit. But Heidegger gives quite a 
peculiar turn to this habituation.  Ἕξις is to be obtained by going through 
(durchmachen) diﬀ erent situations, which are explicitly characterized as dan-
gerous situations (gefährliche Situationen).62 What enables one to get a new 
hold on the emotional access to the world thus resembles less of a gradual 
process of training and more of a frequent confrontation with danger. As sur-
prising as this twist to Aristotle may be, it is decisive for the interpretation of 
ἕξις: it constitutes a moment of reduction63 by which one is torn out of one’s 
mode of everyday existence and obliged to answer to the proposition of a pos-
sibility of a (new) mode of existence. And it is only by confrontation with 
danger, and in resisting drawing back from the danger, that the speciﬁ c adver-
biality of a Dasein could be changed, i.e., the ἕξις could be changed by Dasein 
itself.64 Conceded, Heidegger characterizes this process of the acquisition of 
ἕξις also as Umgang—“it is in interaction with other people that we become 
staid and prudent”65—but this more tame rendering of the situation in which 
ἕξις is acquired is immediately thereafter destabilized by implying that this 
very interaction with people is the dangerous situation in the face of which 
one could form a ἕξις. Furthermore, in this regard, Heidegger insists on his 
interpretation that virtue is learned not  by mere reﬂ ection but by daring into 
existence (Sichauswagen in das Dasein [GA 18: 181]). 
62) On the one page (GA 18: 181), Heidegger uses twice the adjective “gefährlich” and once the 
noun “Gefahr.” It should be noted that the notion of danger is to be found here and there 
throughout this lecture course.
63) I use the notion of “reduction” here in the Heidegerrian sense as analyzed most clearly by 
Rudolf Bernet in “La réduction phénoménologique et la double vie du sujet,” in La vie du sujet. 
Recherches sur l’interprétation de Husserl dans la phénoménologie (Paris: PUF (Epiméthée), 1994), 
5–36. 
 However, it becomes apparent that the exact nature of the reduction by danger has not been 
clariﬁ ed: does it come over me or do I bring it about? One ﬁ nds a well-known example of the 
latter in §283 of Nietzsche’s Fröhliche Wissenschaft.
64) Cf. GA 18: 181: “Erst dadurch, daß das Leben sich nicht vor seinen eigenen Möglichkeiten 
und Gefahren zurückzieht, ist die Gelegenheit geboten, dieses Wie des Daseins selbst auszu-
bilden” (my italics).
65) GA 18: 181: “Dadurch, daß wir miteinander im Umgang mit Menschen sind, werden wir 
gesetzt und besonnen.”
344 E. Wolﬀ  / Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008) 317–357
If there is then still any doubt as to Heidegger’s non-declared wish to write 
out the habituation from virtue acquisition, one could follow the movement 
by which he pursues the realization of this wish. 
1.  In his interpretation of ἕξις by the formula “we get them [the virtues] by 
using them” (χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν [EN 1103a30–31]), he insists that we 
appropriate a ἕξις by making use of the possibilities of the acts (Handeln) 
or concerns (Besorgen) of emotions (Beﬁ nden) and adds that we do not have 
it to then make use of it. Th is corresponds with Aristotle’s view insofar as 
the ἕξις is not a natural capacity or disposition and thus a disposition 
acquired (in practice).66 But Heidegger’s negation is ambiguous: it rein-
forces what had just been stated, but it could also be read as contradicting 
Aristotle—we do, according to the latter, use our virtues (or for that matter 
our ἕξεις) after having acquired them, in fact, that is the very reason why 
attention should be given to acquiring the right ἕξεις. If Heidegger is read 
in this way, he would seem to say that ἕξις is hardly acquired or had; it is to 
be reconquered anew every time.67
2.  Th is statement of the non-habitual acquiredness of the ἕξις is then rein-
forced by declaring that there is for the taking of the chance (Gelegenheit-
Nehmen) and daring (Sichauswagen) by which the ἕξις is formed no τέχνη 
or παραγγελία (command, instruction).68 Th is means that the way 
in which this formation will take place cannot be programmed before-
hand, neither by skillful know-how (which, as we have already seen, is, 
according to Heidegger’s view of τέχνη, programmed by the   ιδος or image 
of what is to be brought about) nor by “something like a general military 
command, an a priori ethics” (so etwas wie einen allgemeinen Armeebefehl, 
66) See introduction to previous subsection.
67) Aristotle incidentally states explicitly in the same passage (EN 1103a 32) that one is to under-
stand this acquisition of virtue by analogy to that of technical skill: one acquires virtues by doing 
virtuous things in order to acquire the ἕξις of practicing virtues, just as one acquires a skill by 
practicing the skill in order to acquire the stable practical know-how.
68) Th e text from which Heidegger cites here (EN 1104a7–10) serves to explain the nature of 
precision to be expected from reﬂ ection on conduct. Aristotle states that “the λόγος that one can 
have concerning each single thing [form of action] can not be exact” (ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα 
λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τἀκριβές) and that one can therefore follow no general τέχνη or παραγγελία in 
the particular case, but should consider the occasion in itself (τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν). He 
clariﬁ es this idea by the example of two τεχναί: “it is just like in the case of medecine and naviga-
tion” (ὣσπερ καὶ ἐπι τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς). Th is analogy is completely lost 
in Heidegger’s reading, and it is exactly this ὣσπερ that is my concern.
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eine apriorische Ethik [GA 18: 182]). If then disposition is not acquired like 
a skill that is learned from others or by order from another, it follows that: 
“everybody has to have his/her glance directed, time and again, for himself/
herself, to that which is on the occasion and concerns him/her” ( Jeder muß 
je für sich selbst den Blick gerichtet haben auf das, was im Augenblick ist und 
ihn angeht [GA 18: 182]). With this latter conclusion, Heidegger couples 
his refusal of a programmable acquisition of ἕξις (and thus the serious 
playing down of acquisition of ἕξις by habituation) with a rejection of the 
inﬂ uence of the others in this process, i.e., the role of explicit or implicit 
education of ἕξις.69 What is at stake in the formation of the ἕξις is the 
individual human being within his/her singular circumstances of danger 
(that is, the Augenblick or καιρός) that concerns himself/herself and on 
which each person should thus provide his/her own unique response. In 
this way an important step is given in the direction of the depolitization of 
the ethical virtues: ἕξις is what concerns me and my singular possibilities, 
in my circumstances, and is directed to myself as τέλος of the virtue. Th is 
self-directedness to which a ἕξις could enable πρᾶξις, distinguishes it from 
τέχνη, since the latter’s only concern is to produce a product that functions 
correctly (cf. GA 18: 182). Nothing is said about any similarities between 
skill and virtue. 
3.  In line with the ﬁ rst two aspects of the crossing out of habituation from the 
acquisition of ἕξις, Heidegger will make the distinction between excercise 
(Übung) and repetition (Wiederholung), which I shall analyze later on. 
Having laid out the basic structure of the genesis of the ἕξις, Heidegger now 
proceeds by characterizing the agent of the ἕξις by using Aristotle’s compari-
son of virtue (to which ἕξις leads) with skill (the same comparison that I have 
discussed above in §2.1): the virtuous action is such due to the ἕξις, the πως 
ἔχων (EN 1105a32) of the agent that is characterized by 1) acting in knowl-
edge (εἰδώς), which Heidegger immediately associates with circumspection 
69) By this, I do not want to suggest that one should allow the other to be, as it were, virtuous in 
my place, neither do I negate the real possibility of entering into opposition to current values and 
ways of doing. But I ask whether the other is only part of the danger and not sometimes either 
my teacher in virtue or my companion in the exercise of it. Would the concession that the forma-
tion of ἕξις depends on a social setting necessarily mean the impossibility of ﬁ nding the mean, 
the dissolution into das Man? Is it completely unimaginable that a real ἕξις, as Heidegger seeks 
it, could be socially formed? In any case, stating that virtue is formed only in opposition to the 
others rather than by social inﬂ uence is very far from Aristotle’s opinion.
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(φρόνησις),70 i.e., acting with Umsichtigkeit directed at the occasion (καιρός, 
Augenblick), 2) acting as προαιρούμενος, “from a real resolution to . . . (aus 
einem wirklichen Entschlossensein zu . . .), translates Heidegger and adds, “he 
has to act from himself” (er muß von sich selbst her handeln), and 3) acting as 
βεβάιως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων, which is to say, “ﬁ rm, not being brought 
out of composure” (fest und nicht aus der Fassung zu bringen), or again, act-
ing as “having-arrived-at-another-composure” (in-eine-andere-Fassung-Gekom-
mensein), which is uncharacteristic of the everyday existence (GA 18: 183). Th e 
adverbs βεβαίως (steadfastly or ﬁ rmly) and ἀμετακινήτως (immovable) are 
however not explained—which surprises us, given the care that Heidegger has 
taken to let traces of permanence in the ἕξις fade away. Th is puzzle could be 
solved if one accepts that Heidegger’s translation of the phrase in question 
points not in the direction of an acquired, stable disposition but rather in the 
direction of an unwavering resistance to the usual, everyday being thrown 
about by the changes of emotions, the πάθη, the Mitgenommenwerden or Aus-
der-Fassung-Geraten (GA 18: 242), a resistance that is a steadfast “‘having-by-
yourself ’ of a determined possibility to be such and such” (‘Bei-sich-haben’ 
einer bestimmten Möglichkeit so und so zu sein—according to the ontological 
deﬁ nition of ἕξις in GA 18: 144). In other words, the βεβάιως is steadfastness 
with reference to the changes of how one ﬁ nds oneself (Beﬁ ndlichkeit), rather 
than the sedimentation of a disposition, as Aristotle is usually thought to 
mean. 
Th us Heidegger fully exploits Aristotle’s threefold distinction between the 
agent of virtue and the agent of skill; in fact, he even drives the two further 
apart. Th is could be seen in his gloss on the ﬁ rst point: not without conceding 
later, on the same page, that this point is shared by skill and virtue, Heidegger 
reformulates this point by equating εἰδώς with φρόνησις and by explaining 
that this speciﬁ c kind of εἰδώς is such that the agent of virtue “has to act with 
the right ‘circumspection,’ that is oriented towards the καιρός in view of the 
ﬁ eld [of the matter of the καιρός]” (muß in der rechten “Umsichtigkeit” han-
deln, die hinsichtlich des Sachgebietes orientiert ist auf den καιρός) (GA 18: 
183)—this is vocabulary that Heidegger reserves for πρᾶξις (as has been indi-
cated above and will be seen in the discussion later on). Ironically this formu-
lation would suit Aristotle perfectly well where he spoke about the need to 
consider the particularity of the occasion as is done in the τεχνάι (and as I have 
indicated in footnote 68). Instead of recognizing and exploring this similarity, 
70) For a useful bibliography of Heidegger’s reappropriation of Aristotle’s φρόνησις, cf. J. Back-
mann, “Divine and Mortal Motivation,” 259–60 n. 42.
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Heidegger opts to formulate (with the support of EN 1105b1–2) a second 
gloss on the ﬁ rst point, such that it clariﬁ es how the agent of skill could be 
considered to act εἰδώς or εἰδέναι: “In τέχνη only the correct subject-knowl-
edge is relevant. What kind of fellow I am, plays no role in cobblery” (Bei der 
τέχνη kommt nur die rechte Sachkenntnis in Frage. Was ich selbst für ein Kerl bin, 
spielt für die Schusterei keine Rolle [GA 18: 183]).71 In other words, Heidegger 
thus separates acting “with knowledge”—which Aristotle thought was shared 
by the agent of virtue and the agent of skill, albeit in diﬀ erent degrees—so 
that, for the one, acting “with knowledge” means circumspectly seizing the 
occasion appropriately, but for the other, it is simply applying subject-knowl-
edge as an internalized prescription (Vorschrift). Th us Heidegger advances in 
the construction of his notion of ἕξις that is at the basis of ἀρετή, a ἕξις that 
has nothing in common with the life of technical skill.
But what most retains Heidegger’s attention in this threefold characteriza-
tion of the agent of virtue is the last two points (what Heidegger calls “das 
Προαιρούμενος-βεβαίως-Sein” [GA 18: 184]). Following these, Heidegger 
characterizes the agent of ethical virtue as someone who acts from himself/
herself (von sich selbst her). Instead of taking ﬂ ight into the majority of people’s 
Geschwätz—that discussion about ethical conﬂ icts by which the οἱ πολλοὶ 
believe they could generate moral conduct—the true agents of ethical virtue 
succeed in “having the authentic existence by themselves” (die eigentliche 
Existenz bei sich selbst haben, as Heidegger renders οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω 
φιλοσοφοῦντες [GA 18: 184]).72 Heidegger can now proceed to explain what 
ἀρετή as ἕξις is, what the “eigentliche Existenz” is in contradistinction both to 
the average everydayness and to the technical life. And he can do so while hav-
ing the full beneﬁ t of the crossing out of social habituation from his notion of 
ἕξις and the exaggerated distinction between virtue and skill taken over from 
71) Heidegger choses here a skill that suits his argument: making and repairing shoes needs a 
certain knowledge that is to be put into practice and the client of the cobbler cares only about 
having good shoes. It is however very diﬃ  cult to imagine that a cobbler would succeed in attract-
ing his clientele if he does not have the ἕξις of a good cobbler which would also be characterized 
as βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων, i.e., “fest und nicht aus der Fassung zu bringen” (GA 18: 
183). In concrete terms that means that he has to have mastered a level of perfectionism, the 
perseverance to continue skillfully under pressure or under boredom, the wisdom to know when 
to refuse a task that the circumstances would not allow to be accomplished, etc.
72)  And a few pages later, the opposite pole from the common Geschwätz is characterized when 
Heidegger presents virtue directed at the mean “die sich selbst ausgrenzt ‘durch das Sprechen’ mit 
der Welt, in der Weise des Vorüberlegens des Augenblicks, durch das Wie des Durchsprechens 
der Umstände” (GA 18:188).
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Aristotle and ampliﬁ ed. In the subsequent analysis of virtue, which clariﬁ es 
still further the second and third aspect of the characterization of the agent of 
virtue, it will become apparent that these acquisitions play a major role in his 
reappropriation of Aristotle’s ἀρετή. Th is authentic existence, the life of the 
agent of virtue, is laid out in the exposition of ἀρετή as aiming at the mean 
(μεσότης).
In order to understand the mean as part of authentic existence, one should 
be reminded of the relation between virtue as ἕξις and the changing of emo-
tion: “our being-in-the-world is always characterized by this state of being 
elevated and dejected, and precisely so that we ﬁ nd ourselves in the extremes 
as taken along by a depression or an elevated state” (GA 18: 185)73 or even 
more explicitly “on average and ordinarily we are taken along, moving in 
extremes” (Durchschnittlich und alltäglich sind wir mitgenommen, bewegen wir 
uns in Ausschlägen [GA 18: 242]). Now this swing or these extremes (Ausschlä-
gen) are what Aristotle called excess (ὑπερβολή) and defect (ἔλλειψις) (cf. EN 
1107a2–3), i.e., the swing towards the extremes that represent the vices. How 
Heidegger goes about introducing the idea of being taken along (mitgenom-
men) is not clear, since for Aristotle, though sometimes people could be taken 
along, often those people who live in vice are trained in their own way—they 
have a ἕξις, but a badly formed one that does not allow them to achieve the 
appropriate, prudent μεσότης for them in a particular situation—which means 
they have a ἕξις that tends rather towards a vice or extreme than a virtue, but 
it is a ἕξις nonetheless and not simply being taken along. Be that as it may, it 
is with reference to this condition that there is a Gefaßtsein of the emotions, a 
disposition or a steadfastness within the Mitgenommenheit. As such it is a par-
ticular modiﬁ cation of the πάθη, of how one is in the world. Virtue, ἀρετή, is 
a form of disposition that seeks the mean that would be beneﬁ cial to the par-
ticular agent, within a particular context. “Our being as characterized by its 
always-there does not lend itself to having one-oﬀ  and absolute norms imposed on 
it. It boils down to shaping the being of the human being in such a way that 
it is set in the aptitude of holding the middle. However that means nothing dif-
ferent from seizing the moment” (GA 18: 186).74 Viewed ontologically, the 
73) “Unser In-der-Welt-sein ist immer charakterisiert durch diese Beﬁ ndlichkeit des Gehoben- 
und Gedrücktseins, und zwar so, daß wir uns in den Ausschlägen beﬁ nden, von einer Mißstim-
mung oder gehobenen Stimmung mitgenommen.”
74) “Für unser Sein, charakterisiert durch die Jeweiligkeit, läßt sich keine einmalige und absolute 
Norm geben. Es kommt darauf an, das Sein des Menschen so auszubilden, daß es in die Eignung 
versetzt wird, die Mitte zu halten. Das besagt aber nichts anderes als den Augenblick zu 
ergreifen.”
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virtue refers to an aptitude (Eignung) to keep to this beneﬁ cial, non-mathe-
matical mean.75 Th e virtue as ἕξις is then an orientation to the world such that 
one is directed at seizing the moment (Augenblick, καιρός). Th e having (ἔχειν) 
of the ἕξις is not the having (Haben) of the everyday world, since the latter is 
reserved for the Vor-Struktur of familiarity with the world, and this familiarity 
would be due to the internalization of ‘einmalige und absolute Normen.’76 But 
there is no familiarity on which the Heideggerian ἕξις could be based. What 
then is this aptitude to ﬁ nd the mean in the moment?
Th e last subsection of §17 takes as a theme the seizing of the moment. If the 
mean is not a mathematical middle, but the right talking-through of the situ-
ation (Durchsprechen der Umstände), it should be concluded, says Heidegger, 
that it would be incorrect to consider virtue as a skill (Fertigkeit; and it will 
become clear from the ensuing discussion that this is τέχνη). In order to appre-
ciate what is at stake in this distinction between virtue and skill, Heidegger 
once again traces the genesis of the ἕξις: ἕξεις are brought about δι᾽ ἔθους. He 
summarizes that “‘habituation’ is the way by which we come to ἕξις, to ἀρετή” 
(Die ‘Gewöhnung’ ist der Weg, auf dem wir zur ἕξις kommen, zur ἀρετή [GA 18: 
188]). “Gewöhnung” has to be written between inverted commas, lest the 
meaning of this word is misunderstood—Gewöhnung, ἐθιζειν, Heidegger 
clariﬁ es, is “bringing-yourself-to-a-determined-possibility by often-making-
through” (das Sich-in-eine-bestimmte-Möglichkeit-Bringen durch das Öfter-
Durchmachen [GA 18: 188]). Th e possibility in question here is, however, 
twofold; Heidegger will distinguish two possibilities of existence that are 
acquired δι᾽ ἔθους, but in which this expression does not mean the same for 
each. Th ese are ποίησις (“the acquisition of the possibility of a production, 
technics”—die Aneignung der Möglichkeit einer Verfertigung, Technik) and 
πρᾶξις (“not taken in the broader meaning of ‘action’ as such, but as modiﬁ -
cation of the being of the human being”—nicht genommen in der weiteren 
Bedeutung ‘Handlung’ als solche, sondern als Bestimmung des Seins des Menschen 
75) Translated usually as aptitude, Eignung could here also be taken to evoke the semantic ﬁ eld 
of eignen in the sense of possessing something, Aneignung, appropriation, or eigne/eigen, one’s 
own; introduced against the backdrop of the Jeweiligkeit, one could perhaps think of “daß es in 
die Eignung versetzt wird” as, “that it is moved to its ownness or Eigentlichkeit.” Th e verb ver-
setzen is also used in German in the sense of moving someone to feel in this or that way, and 
thus by using this verb Heidegger might be considered to be maintaining the link between ἕξις 
and emotions.
76) It will become clear from the ensuing discussion of the distinction between Übung and Wied-
erholung that this claim is not only allowed for by the current text, but also supported by my 
preceding exposition of τέχνη in §19 of GA 18.
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[GA 18: 188–89]). Heidegger seems to say that this deﬁ nition of “Gewöh-
nung” applies equally to both possibilities, and thus the diﬀ erence between 
the two possibilities hinges on very little, in fact, perhaps only on the manner 
in which both is a “sich in . . . bringen,” an Aneignung, an appropriation or 
acquisition.77 
If this is true, then the diﬀ erence between the two modes of existence does 
not depend that much on what is appropriated, but on the way in which it is 
gone through (the Öfter-Durchmachen), since it is the adverbiality of this 
going-through that constitutes the appropriation. Th ese two ways of appro-
priation are called exercise (Übung) and repetition (Wiederholung), respec-
tively. Exercise as mode of often-going-through typical of the acquisition of 
technical skill is characterized by its initial orientation to an instruction or 
prescription (Vorschrift) that is gradually left behind, in the sense of being 
interiorized. Th e very aim of exercise is, according to Heidegger, to cancel 
deliberation (die Überlegung zum Ausfall zu bringen) as to the realization of the 
desired result. Since it is the result that is decisive in τέχνη, the delivery of the 
result demands the smoothest procedure of the process of production, which 
is implied to be without deliberation, mechanically following rules or princi-
ples. It is even suggested that the realization of the sought after result requires 
the “bringing-into-play or activation of a ﬁ xed skill” (Ins-Spiel-Bringen einer 
festsitzenden Fertigkeit [GA 18: 189]); on the next page Heidegger qualiﬁ es 
skill as a “ﬁ xed routine” (festsitzende Routine). A benevolent translation would 
render festsitzend as “stable,” but it should rather be translated with “stuck,” or 
at least “ﬁ xed.” Everything points in the direction of an automatic, unreﬂ ected, 
predetermined execution of the working process (Betrieb). Th is, again, can 
only be realized by means of exercise, and exercise is the manner in which 
ποίησις as mode of existence is appropriated. Th is is the mode of existence 
that we have seen in the introduction to be the manner in which people exist 
in their average everydayness, that is, the familiarity, the Haben, that condi-
tion from which the hermeneutic being-in-the-world is originally derived. On 
the other hand, repetition (Wiederholung) as mode of often-going-through 
typical of πρᾶξις, is distinguished by the decision (προαίρεσις, Entschluß, or 
Sichentschließen) from which it rises. If skill is then characterized by the exclu-
sion of deliberation and decision, then right or virtuous action can never be a 
skill. Repetition by which the deliberative-decision-taking existence is appro-
priated is not routinely practiced but entails “acting in every moment newly 
77) Cf. GA 18: 189: “Ποίησις und πρᾶχις zwei Möglichkeiten, die vielleicht nur zwei ver-
schiedene Weisen der Aneignung bezeichnen.”
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from out of the relevant decision” (in jedem Augenblick neu aus dem entsprech-
enden Entschluß heraus Handeln [GA 18: 189]). In contradistinction to the 
routine ﬁ xedness brought about by exercise that destroys (zerstört) the moment 
or breaks down (versagt) in the face of the moment,78 repetition forms a ἕξις 
that opens in every moment onto a new decision; it is a “holding-oneself-free, 
δύναμις in the μεσότης” (Sichfreihalten, δύναμις in der μεσότης [GA 18: 190]). 
However, it is not possible to hold one’s entire life in this exclusive position; 
one loses this possibility, and it is diﬃ  cult to regain it. 
Had Heidegger not beforehand carefully eliminated the aspect of habitua-
tion from the genesis of ἀρετή, this sharp distinction between the two possi-
bilities of existence would not have come that easily. Furthermore, the company 
of the others in whose presence not only the habituation takes place, but the 
practice of the virtuous life as well, is passed over in silence. Now the full 
meaning has unfolded of the anticipated sketch that Heidegger had given 
earlier in §17 of the ἕξις: “Th e being-composed is not something chosen as 
you like and undetermined. In the ἕξις is situated the primary orientation to 
the καιρός: ‘I am here, come what may!’ It is this being-here, being-at-your-
post in a situation opposite your aﬀ air, which is characterized by the ἕξις. Th e 
ἕξις, that is, as a possibility of being, that is in itself related to another possibility, 
related to the possibility of my being, that within my being something happens 
to me, that changes my composure” (GA 18: 176).79 Th e ἕξις is the possibility of 
being on guard without anybody (except myself?) giving any παραγγελία (so 
etwas wie einen allgemeinen Armeebefehl, eine apriorische Ethik [GA 18: 182]), 
without any set of norms to adhere to, but under seizure of the danger consti-
tuted by the others. Dasein stands at its post and has to act from himself/
herself (von sich selbst her), standing ﬁ rm, but circumspectly so, since this ﬁ rm-
ness has to be reinvented as often as possible in order to assure that he/she has 
“die eigentliche Existenz bei sich selbst” (GA 18: 184). Dasein stands at its post 
alone and any concession 1) that Dasein has learned from another how to 
be at its post—even if that other is his/her own earlier self (i.e., any idea of 
78) It should be noted that Heidegger is here in contradiction with Aristotle who precisely illus-
trated the τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν with reference to the τεχναί of medicine and naviga-
tion.
79) “Das Gefaßtsein ist nicht ein beliebiges und unbestimmtes, in der ἕξις liegt die primäre 
Orientierung auf den καιρός: ‘Ich bin da, es mag kommen, was will!’ Dieses Da-sein, Auf-dem-
Posten-Sein in einer Lage, seiner Sache gegenüber, das charakterisiert die ἕξις. Die ἕξις also als 
eine Seinsmöglichkeit, die in sich selbst auf eine andere Möglichkeit bezogen ist, auf die Möglich-
keit meines Seins, daß innerhalb meines Seins etwas über mich kommt, das mich aus der Fassung 
bringt.”
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experience), 2) that Dasein is accompanied and aided in being at the post by 
others, or 3) that the conditions for being at his/her post has been put in place, 
that is, has been made possible, by others—any of these three concessions 
would amount for Heidegger to abandoning the post to inﬁ ltration, to sur-
rendering, or to taking ﬂ ight in the face of danger.
4. Conclusion
Th is reading of Heidegger’s Destruktion of Aristotle’s notions of τέχνη and ἕξις 
leads me to two related conclusions: ﬁ rst, that Heidegger exaggerated the dif-
ference between technical existence and the life of virtue, i.e., that it is more 
correct to see these two aspects of human action as much more similar and, 
second, that the life of the ethical disposition has much more of technicity to 
it, due to their common participation in a general human ἕξις, than Hei-
degger would allow for. But these points will have to be formulated more 
clearly and argued more fully. 
Our discussion of τέχνη in section 2 allows us to conclude with the claim 
that τέχνη is much closer to ἀρετή than Heidegger would allow for. He will-
ingly inherits an exaggerated distinction from Aristotle that he drives even 
further. Instead, it seems much more plausible to conceive of these two 
aspects of existence as much closer, and this because both are manifestations 
of one ἕξις μετὰ λόγου. Th e closeness between the agent, circumstances, and 
action of ποίησις and πρᾶξις has been argued above, without collapsing the 
distinction completely. Th e role of the ἕξις μετὰ λόγου is to provide a stabil-
ity of know-how that allows for the agent to act as a master craftsman or as 
a master of virtuosity. Th is is informed by a general knowledge of the rele-
vant terrain, without this knowledge guaranteeing success. In fact, it does 
not even prescribe the minutest detail of the situation in which to act. In the 
καιρός (be it of τέχνη or of ἀρετή) the competent person chooses the best 
ratio (the μεσότης) of a series of distinguishable increments that describe the 
adverbiality of the action. Th is is done by taking into consideration the 
agent himself/herself, the situation of the action, and what has to be brought 
about.
But this is an ideal for both the apprentice craftsman and the inexperienced 
agent of politics. Hence the need to follow someone else’s example and advice, 
to exercise in doing the right kind of action; and of course, for the master as 
for the apprentice, this could only be done if the surrounding conditions allow 
for it. 
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Heidegger’s inability to see this closeness of the life of virtue and the techni-
cal life has important consequences for his perspective on the latter. Heidegger’s 
τεχνΐτης is at best an early beginner. Th is apprentice is not on course to learn 
diﬃ  cult or complex tasks. It is a technician who thinks only about means and 
is not capable of adjusting means and ends mutually to one another. It is one 
that quickly grinds to a standstill if he/she runs out of instructions from the 
master as to how exactly something should be done in a certain context.  Th ere 
is for this craftsman no tension between what would ideally be achieved and 
his/her capacity to bring it about; it is an ambitionless craftsman (or perhaps 
sometimes one that is naively ambitious). It is one who works by merely 
mechanically executing what he/she has been instructed to do. Style is, 
strangely enough, completely planned by this technician (or by his/her instruc-
tor). Th e only dexterity that he/she has acquired is to have internalized the 
prescription of how to do a task and to execute it automatically. Perhaps this 
image of technical life does not invalidate Heidegger’s criticism of the meta-
physics of presence—this is however not my question. What is sure is that 
once technical life has been misconstrued in this way, it becomes conceivable 
to start thinking of characterizing in a general way the agent of everyday con-
cern and occupation as ‘one’ or ‘they’ (das Man)—an easily replaceable worker, 
with no particular style, nor exceptional expertise; it becomes possible to con-
sider this existence as being of such a nature that one lets oneself be drawn 
along in the concern for the world (Sichmitnehmenlassen von ihr [NB 19]), to 
the extent that one is all the time subjected to the tendency of Verfallen an . . . 
(the Verfallensgeneightheit of NB 19), which gradually hardens more and more 
in Heidegger’s reﬂ ection to a simple Verfallen, and hence the distinctive quasi-
ethical undertones in the hermeneutics of facticity of salvaging Dasein from its 
Wegsein.80
80) Cf. for example Jean Grondin, “L’herméneutique dans Sein und Zeit,” in Le tournant her-
méneutique de la phenomenologie (Paris: Presses Universities de France, 2003), 38–56, especially 
52–56. Michel Haar has already shown that Heidegger’s description of everydayness that under-
lies the whole of Sein und Zeit is “based on a presupposition that is non-phenomenological, since 
it does not depend on a description of the phenomena of the world, but on a preconceived idea 
of Dasein” as the authentic self (Soi propre). See Michel Haar, “L’énigme de la quotidienneté,” in 
La fracture de l’Histoire. Douze essais sur Heidegger (Grenoble: Jérôme Million, 1994), 61–72 
(citation, 66–67). Th e current essay is a contribution to an understanding of what is understood 
by Heidegger to be in contradistinction from this authentic self—at least that part of the every-
day life that is the technical life—and how Heidegger went about to construct this preconceived 
idea of Dasein.
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What seems sure to me is that while Heidegger was presenting his students 
with a destructive reading of the tradition, in order to open up what has been 
obstructed by it even if that obstruction itself guides us to a phenomenon (in 
this case the question of being), he did so not only by transmitting to them the 
tradition’s obscuring picture of technical life, but at the same time obscuring 
it further.
Th e discussion of ἕξις and in particular the opposition of Übung and 
Wiederholung with which section 3 of the current article ended, left no 
doubt as to Heidegger’s wish to separate virtue and skill. But do they not 
have anything in common? Is virtue as mode of existence only a departure 
from or a leaving-behind of skill as its opposite mode of existence? I shall 
consider myself to have been enabled to conclude that there is something 
common to virtue and skill, if it could be argued plausibly that what Hei-
degger discusses in his destructive reading of Aristotle’s ἕξις is, contrary to 
what the German philosopher says, dependent on 1) the sedimentation of 
some or other know-how, 2) a process of acquisition of that know-how, and 
3) conditions in which to practice this know-how—all three of these presup-
pose a dependency on 4) the involvement of others. Whereas the preceding 
analyses probably do not allow arguing this case completely, they do allow 
arguing that there is at the very least a strong prima facie case for elements of 
technicity in the ἕξις πρακτική. 
Of course, in claiming this I presuppose, not the kind of technicity that is 
sketched by Aristotle in his exaggerated distinction between τέχνη and ἀρετή, 
but rather the kind of technicity that I have presented in my criticism of Aris-
totle and that is rooted in the common ἕξις with its two appearances, ἕξις 
πρακτική and ἕξις ποιητική, both of which are ἕξεις μετὰ λόγου. Now as we 
have seen, Heidegger drove virtue and skill still further apart. It should have 
become clear that what Heidegger presents as technical life is nothing but a 
reductive caricature thereof. He needed this caricature in order to develop his 
notion of ἕξις in opposition to it: thus the unmasking of the caricature should 
amount to raising a ﬁ rst doubt concerning his new version of ἕξις, since Hei-
degger fails to provide suﬃ  cient justiﬁ cation for the extreme separation of 
virtue and ἕξις; had his presentation of technical life been more plausible, this 
distinction would have been made much more diﬃ  cult. But perhaps, as 
Michel Haar has argued, Heidegger is not guided here by description, but by 
 I do not think that my analyses allow me to reject outright Heidegger’s notion of Verfallen and 
of Man, but it seems to oppose the ease with which he applies these terms categorically to every-
day existence.
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a presupposed idea of what authentic Dasein is. It is this preconceived idea 
that guides Heidegger to separate the commonality of virtue and skill in terms 
like εἰδώς, μεσότης, βεβαίως, ἐθιζειν, and καιρός and motivates his unde-
clared disregard of important analogies from technical life that Aristotle 
repeatedly used precisely to illustrate how virtue works.
Th is exaggeration of Aristotle’s distinction could best be seen in the care 
that Heidegger takes to write out social habituation from virtue as mode of 
existence. It is in this very act, that the desocialization and depolitization of 
the authentic existence take place. Th is depolitization has been commented on 
often, and I shall not go into the detail here. It suﬃ  ces to repeat that in Hei-
degger’s ἕξις, Dasein acts alone and von sich selbst her, in the face of the danger 
of the other (but without the danger of the other ever being suﬃ  ciently pre-
sented). One ﬁ nds no argumentation for the possibility of acting in a way 
independent of social habituation but that would nonetheless have meaning, 
even if it is only for Dasein itself. Without some form of prejudice or Vorhabe, 
pertaining not only to the kind of actions with which one is familiar and from 
which the virtuous action is an exception, but prejudice of the new action 
itself, the latter will not be virtuous (κατ᾽ ἀρετήν) but meaningless; acting not 
like the others is no meaning in itself. Aristotle’s notion of ἕξις, with its spe-
ciﬁ c element of habituation, would be able to account for an understandable 
newness, without claiming that having acquired such a ἕξις would guarantee 
the attainment of virtuous action. Certainly then there is no “einmalige Norm” 
for seizing the καιρός, but Heidegger’s overstatement passes in silence the 
middle option between an action that is absolutely determined by rule and 
one in which there is no rule at all, namely, hermeneutic engagement—and it 
is exactly in Aristotle’s technical examples of what it means to seize the καιρός 
(the carpenter, doctor, navigator) that we see what this engagement means. 
Aristotle shows to us an εἰδώς that characterizes the agent of virtue and that is 
perhaps, as Heidegger indicates, of the nature of φρόνησις, but this φρόνησις 
is socio-culturally formed: as ἕξις it archives implicitly the conditions of its 
acquisition. Lastly, one searches in vain for any recognition by Heidegger that 
the conditions for exercising his Wiederholung could have been created by oth-
ers. Th at this negligence could have been avoided by a less partial reading of 
Aristotle has been illustrated by Martha Nussbaum’s reading of Aristotle in 
which full recognition is given to the importance of this reference in the prac-
tice of virtue to the others.81 
81) She draws of course from various other sources as well to develop her capabilities approach to 
a (partial) theory of justice, but see especially her “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in Liberalism 
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On the basis of these remarks, a case could be made to claim that what 
Heidegger presents in his discussion of the exercise of ἕξις is much more 
dependent on socially acquired capability that is exercised in favorable condi-
tions created at least partially by others than Heidegger is willing to admit. If 
this is true, then one would have to conclude that there is a particular kind of 
technicity in the ἕξις πρακτική that, though probably not the same thing as 
the ἕξις  ποιητική, is not too dissimilar from it either, in fact, the two seem to 
be variations of one human ἕξις. Th e authentic existence is much more of a 
τέχνη, provided that the τέχνη is understood in a sense much closer to that of 
virtue, as I have done above. Πρᾶξις as mode of existence is more social and 
less creative than Heidegger taught his students in 1924.82
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